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ABSTRACT 
 
Credit derivatives, some of the most significant developments is the financial 
industry, have experienced significant growth recently. The objective of this study is to 
examine whether the use of credit derivatives, either buying or selling, has an effect on 
????????????????????behaviour. Minton et al. (2009) propose that the net buyers of credit 
protection save capital and thus should be able to make loans at rates that are below the 
rates offered by competitors who do not utilize credit derivatives. In addition, Hirtle 
(2009) investigates the relationship between credit derivatives and their effects on bank 
lending activities. She does not find a strong association between the use of credit 
derivative and the supply of loans and proposes that banks are using credit derivatives 
mainly to provide longer maturity and lower spread loans rather than to increase the 
volume of loans. 
 In contrast to previous studies, our study investigates the relation between loan 
prices, measured by the interest and fee income per dollar of loans, and the use of credit 
derivatives at BHCs. We propose that if BHCs use credit derivatives to hedge credit 
exposures, they would charge a lower loan rate to the borrowers since CDs enable banks 
to transfer the credit risk away from the lenders. However, if credit derivatives are used 
for purposes other than managing credit exposure, these instruments might not have any 
impact on loan pricing. Another goal of our study is to investigate the relationship 
between loan prices and the use of credit derivatives for trading purpose. We expect that 
during the years when BHCs are net sellers of credit derivatives, they take these positions 
because they have good quality loans and they are willing to take additional risk. In this 
case, they would report lower income per dollar of loans. However, if banks sell CDs as 
part of their speculative strategy, their use of credit derivatives might not have any impact 
on loan prices. Thus, banks would charge a rate that is similar to other banks with the 
same level of risk. Another goal of our study is to find, for both users and non-users of 
credit derivatives, how the interest and fee income generated by the BHCs is affected by 
the risk of default of their clients. We expect that as the risk of default increases, the 
prices on loans would increase as well. Banks take additional risk in exchange for higher 
return. Our final goal of this study is to investigate whether the use of CDs affects the 
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supply of funds or loan rates differently for different types of loans banks hold in their 
portfolios.  
Our findings suggest that the loan prices of users of CDs are significantly less 
than the loan prices of nonusers. This finding may suggest that users are more efficient, 
competitive and diversified than nonusers and thus can afford to charge a lower rate to 
their clients. The result may also suggest that BHCs that are using CDs generally have 
lower risk loan portfolios and these portfolios are generating lower income per dollar of 
assets. Among the users group, we observe that as the volume of CDs purchased 
increases the prices of loans also increase. This suggests additional usage of CDs allows 
users to accept risky loans that they would not accept in the absence of CDs. They are 
initiating these high-risk loans to generate higher interest and fee income and at the same 
time they are using more CDs to hedge these risky loans. Our study also finds a 
significant and positive relationship between the risk of default and BHCs loan prices. 
Our study further investigates the users of credit derivatives during the years 
when these banks use CDs and the years when they do not use CDs. We find that the loan 
prices are marginally lower for the years when CDs are used. In particular, we find a 
significant decrease in prices during the years when these banks are sellers of CDs.  
However, we do not find any significant impact on loan prices during the years when 
they buy CDs. This result suggests that CD-active BHCs that buy CD protection are 
doing so to reduce some excessive risk they have taken without demanding a high rate to 
compensate for this risk.  
Finally, we find that the years when BHCs report both CDs bought and CDs sold, 
they charge a loan price that is similar to the years when these banks do not report any 
position in the CDs market. Perhaps the BHCs that report simultaneously CDs bought 
and CDs sold are selling CDs to generate income and hedging their positions through 
buying offsetting positions. Our analysis also suggests that the impact of the use of 
derivatives varies depending on whether the loans are real estate, consumer, commercial 
and industrial, agricultural, or foreign loans.  
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                                      C H APT E R 1 
IN T R O DU C T I O N A ND M O T I V A T I O N 
 
One of the recent developments in the banking industry is the introduction of 
credit derivatives. The credit default swap, one of the most widely used credit derivatives, 
is basically a bilateral contract between a buyer and a seller where the seller of the 
contract requires periodic payments from the buyer and in return the buyer requires 
protection from the seller if default occurs. Credit derivatives have been promoted on the 
basis that they are risk management tools. For example, Alan Greenspan, the former 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????????? ??? ?????????????????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ??????? ????? ?????
largest banks have found these instruments an attractive tool to manage credit exposure in 
their loan books while allowing them to meet the needs of their largest corporate 
cus??????????????????????????????????????????????????) describes credit derivatives as an 
attractive risk management tool and argues that they allow a financial institution to 
diversify its credit risk enabling it to separate the origination of credit and the funding of 
credit. 
 Following their inception, CDs have experienced a rapid growth. Statistics from 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) reveal that the market 
for the credit default swaps has increased from the notional principal amount of $918.9 
billion at the end of 2001 to $8.42 trillion at the end of 2004. This volume reached $31.22 
trillion at the end of June 2009.  
The significant growth in the volume of credit derivatives prompted policy 
makers, academics, and practitioners to wonder about the risks associated with their 
proliferation and how their use affects lending practices and the availability of credit. In 
terms of risk, excessive credit derivative usage is a common concern for bank regulators 
and numerous studies focus on the capital holdings of the users of credit derivative 
contracts. Sinkey and Carter (2000), Ashraf et al (2005), and Minton et al (2009), argue 
that banks save capital when they hedge using the derivatives market.  
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Most previous studies focus on the impact of credit derivatives on the supply of 
loans. Moser (1998) suggests that in the absence of credit derivatives, a bank can either 
keep a loan on its books or sell the loan. In contrast, the introduction of credit derivatives 
allows the bank to keep the loan while transferring the risk to some other party. Thus, 
credit derivatives allow banks to increase their lending activities and to build a more 
diversified loan portfolio. Hirtle (2009) discusses the use of credit derivatives and their 
effects on bank lending activities. She finds a weak association between the use of credit 
derivative and the supply of loans and proposes that banks are using credit derivatives 
mainly to provide longer maturity and lower spread loans rather than to increase the 
volume of loans. Minton et al. (2009) suggest that the use of credit derivatives is limited 
to hedging loans and argue that the net buyers are more likely to hedge commercial and 
industrial (C& I) loans and foreign loans. In addition, they propose that the net buyers of 
credit protection save capital. As a result, these lenders should be able to make loans at 
rates that are below the rates offered by competitors who do not utilize credit derivatives. 
However, they stop short of examining their proposition. Jing (2010) argues that credit 
derivatives allow banks to efficiently manage the credit exposures on large corporate 
loans, loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, loans to emerging markets, and also 
manage the counterparty credit risk on over the counter derivatives.  
While the focus of these studies is on the impact of credit derivatives on the 
supply of credit, the objective of this study is to examine whether the use of credit 
????????????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ???n pricing behaviour. In 
particular, this study is an attempt to answer the question of whether the buyers of credit 
derivatives are charging lower loan rates in comparison to credit derivative sellers. 
Furthermore, we like to know which borrowers, if any, are benefiting from lower rates or 
suffering from higher rates. We add to the existing literature by considering the impact of 
credit derivative contracts on loan pricing rather than on the growth of lending activities 
of the users.  
Our analytical approach is similar to that of Angbazo (1997). He examines the 
relation between the risk (both the default risk and interest rate risk) at commercial banks 
and the loan and deposit rates. Using the ratio of the net interest margin to average size of 
earning asset?? ??? ?????????? ??? ??????? ??????????????? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ??????????
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risky loans and have higher interest rate risk exposure in their portfolio, they charge a 
higher loan rate to attain higher net interest margin. Using more recent data on US bank 
holding companies, we extend the work of Angbazo (1997) on the relation between bank 
risk and loan rates and in addition we investigate the relation between the use of credit 
derivatives and loan pricing. 
Our results suggest that the prices of loans at users of credit derivatives are 
significantly lower than the prices of loans at nonusers. Among the users group, we find 
that as the volume of CDs increases the prices of loans also increase. When we separate 
the observations of the users group between the years when these banks use credit 
derivatives and the years when they do not use credit derivatives, we find that the prices 
of loans are marginally lower for the years when CDs are used. In particular, we find a 
significant decrease in prices during the years when these banks are sellers of CDs and 
not buyers.  Our analysis also confirms the findings of Angbazo (1997). It suggests a 
positive relation between the risk of default and the prices of loans. This result holds for 
users and nonusers of credit derivatives but for user banks the prices of loans are more 
sensitive to default risk than the prices of loans at non users. In addition, our results 
suggest that users of CDs charge higher prices for real estate loans, commercial and 
industrial loans (C& I loans), consumer loans, and agricultural loans. In contrast, the 
nonusers of CDs charge higher prices for consumer loans and agricultural loans but lower 
prices for foreign loans.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the 
market for credit derivatives. Chapter 3 provides an extensive review of past literature on 
credit derivatives. Chapter 4 lists the hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data, the 
variables, and the methodology we use in this study. Section 6 summarizes the empirical 
findings and section 7 provides the conclusion. 
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C H APT E R 2 
T H E M A R K E T F O R C R E DI T D E RI V A T I V ES 
 This chapter defines credit derivatives, highlights the significance and growth in volume 
of trading in credit derivatives, indicates the regulations that govern the disclosure requirements 
related to credit derivatives, and discusses the official positions of two large banks which are 
active in buying, selling, and trading derivative contracts. 
2.1 The structure of a credit derivative   
 Credit derivatives include credit default swaps (CDS), total return swaps, credit-linked 
notes, credit default swap options, forwards, and futures contracts. We describe the structure of 
credit default swaps (CDS) below: 
A credit default swap contract is an agreement between the default protection buyer and 
the default protection seller. The buyer makes fixed periodic payments, similar to the premiums 
of an insurance contract, to the seller in exchange for a promise by the seller to cover the losses 
of the buyer resulting from any credit event specified in the contract.1 The losses covered are 
related to an underlying asset, usually known as the reference asset or the obligation, which 
would be specified in the contract. The reference asset is usually owned by the buyer and issued 
as an obligation of a third party known as the reference entity which may be a government, a 
governmental agency, or a corporation. The CDS contract does not usually involve transferring 
the reference asset between the buyer and the seller. Figure 1 shows a typical structure of a credit 
default swap contract. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
A total return swap agreement is also a bilateral contract where one party makes 
payments to the other party at either a fixed or variable rate. In return, the other party makes 
payments based on a reference asset such as an equity index, bonds or loans. The total return 
swap is very commonly used by hedge funds. 
                                                                                                                          1     Norden et al (2008) define the premium as the price of the CDS, a measure of compensation required by the 
market for bearing the underlying credit risk of the reference asset.   
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A credit linked note is one type of funded credit derivative with an embedded credit 
default swap that allows the issuer of such securities to transfer the credit risk of the reference 
entity to the buyers of the securities. Buyers receive fixed or floating interest rate payments upon 
the purchase of the securities. In exchange, the issuer promises par value payment at maturity 
unless a specified credit event occurs. In case of default, the buyer receives an amount equal to 
the principal plus the recovery rate.  
A credit spread option is another form of credit derivatives which allows the transfer of 
credit risk from one party to the other. The buyer of a credit spread option pays an initial 
premium to enter into the contract and in exchange, the seller makes cash payments if a given 
credit spread changes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
The credit events that may trigger payment from a credit default derivative contract are 
summarized in Figure 2. It is interesting to note that protection is more comprehensive than a 
guarantee in that it provides protection from events that may be interpreted as furtherance of a 
bankruptcy or insolvency event.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
2.2 The market for credit derivatives 
 The credit derivative market, which is part of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
market, has grown dramatically in recent years as shown in Figure 3. The gross notional amount, 
the total amount of trades that are outstanding, of credit derivative usage rose from 8 trillion in 
2004 to over 60 trillion in 2007. However, this dramatic growth was followed by a decrease 
during 2008 and 2009. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2008) states that 
the looming financial crisis in the first half of 2008 triggered a downturn in the notional volumes 
as sellers became risk averse. In his comments on ISDA Mid-Year 2008 Market Survey, Robert 
Pickel, Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer, ISDA, stated "this decrease primarily 
reflects the industry's efforts to reduce risk by tearing up economically offsetting transactions, 
and demonstrates the industry's ongoing commitment to reduce risk and enhance operational 
efficiency. We expect to see more effects of this over time". Based on the Mid-Year 2008 Market 
Survey, the ISDA reported that the notional amount was approximately $54.6 trillion. The 
notional amount outstanding fell to about 31 trillion at the end of the year 2009. 
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                        [Insert Figure 3 here] 
  
Figure 4 shows market participants of credit derivatives. We can see that banks are major 
players in credit derivative market. Banks buy and sell protection to hedge their positions and 
diversify their portfolios. The pie charts for both buyers and sellers of credit protection show that 
banks have the higher percentage of market shares- 52% as buyers of credit protection and 39% 
as sellers of credit protection. Insurance companies and reinsurers are mainly sellers of credit 
protection. Other participants include mutual funds, pension funds, government agencies, and 
corporations. There are various types of credit derivatives. These include credit default swaps, 
total return swaps, credit-linked notes, and credit-spread options. 
 
        [Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
2.3 Disclosure requirements for credit derivative positions 
The disclosure requirements were originally specified by the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities. FAS 133 was recently (September 12, 2008) amended by a FASB Staff Position 
(FSP), namely FSP FAS 133-1and FIN 45-4, to require specific disclosures by sellers of credit 
derivatives, including credit derivatives embedded in a hybrid instrument1. The same FSP also 
amends FASB Interpretation No. 45, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Guarantees, Including Indirect Guarantees of Indebtedness of O thers, to require disclosure about 
the current status of the payment/performance risk of a guarantee. Overall, FSP FAS 133-1and 
FIN 45-4 require as mandatory the disclosure of the maximum potential amount of future 
payments, the related fair value, and the current status of the payment/performance risk for 
certain guarantees and credit derivatives sold. 
 ________________________ 
1 Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), Financial Accounting Standard (FAS), Financial Stability Plan 
(FSP) 
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2.4 C redit derivatives at C itibank 
 In its 2010 financial statements, Citibank reports that ?The Company uses credit 
derivatives to help mitigate credit risk in its Corporate and Consumer loan portfolios and other 
cash positions, to take proprietary trading positions, and to facilitate client transactions???????
company either purchases or writes credit protection on behalf of its clients and for hedging the 
credit risk of their own accounts. In order to accurately value credit derivatives, Citi uses several 
valuation techniques such as discounted cash flows, Black-Scholes option pricing model, and 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
 As a measure of risk control, Citibank actively monitors the credit risk of its 
counterparties in the credit derivatives contract. In addition, Citi maintains collateral agreements 
to cover its gross receivables from counterparties.2 The collateral required is approximately 85% 
to 89% of the gross receivables. Banks, financial institutions, and other dealers are the majority 
???????????????????????????????.   
2.5 C redit derivatives at Bank of America 
 The Bank of America states in its financial statement of 2010 that the bank actively 
manages the credit risk of both funded and unfunded lending commitments through credit 
derivatives. The Bank of America simultaneously purchases and sells credit protection to obtain 
the desired level of credit exposures.3  
 As at December 31, 2008 and 2009, the net notional credit default protection purchased 
by Bank of America to hedge its credit exposure was respectively $9.7 billion and $19.0 billion. 
According to the 2010 financial statements, the increase is due to the acquisition of Merrill 
Lynch. The financial report also indicates that the net gain of $993 million in the credit 
protection in 2008 is followed by a net loss of $2.9 billion in 2009. The gains and losses in fair 
value of credit derivative instruments are recorded in other income. The average Value-at-Risk                                                                                                                           
2   A collateral agreement is a provision in a risk management agreement that requires one party to provide 
collateral to guarantee performance under the agreement. The agreement usually includes provisions for marking 
positions to market, measuring the collateral requirement, moving collateral around, and even providing a 
physical location for holding the collateral. 
3   The Bank of America states in its financial statements that the majority of its derivatives are over the counter and 
are traded with large, international financial institutions, including broker/dealers and with a variety of non-
financial companies. These derivative transactions are executed on a daily margin basis.  
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(VaR) for these credit derivative hedges increased from $24 million in 2008 to $76 million in 
2009. 
 Similar to Citibank, Bank of America actively monitors, and manages the credit risk 
exposure in its credit derivative contracts, and maintains collateral agreements to cover its gross 
receivables from counterparties. For this purpose, the corporation records the counterparty credit 
risk valuations on derivative assets. These risk valuations are reassessed periodically and 
adjusted if the value of the derivative contract, collateral, or creditworthiness of the counterparty 
changes. If the credit worthiness deteriorates, it can increase the amount of collateral or terminate 
the transaction with the counterparty. The corporation states in its financial statement that ????
December 31, 2009, the Corporation received cash and securities collateral of $74.6 billion and 
posted cash and securities collateral of $69.1 billion in the normal course of business under 
derivative ???????????? 
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      C H APT E R 3 
                   L I T E R A T UR E R E V I E W 
 
 Previous literatures cover various characteristics of financial institutions that use credit 
derivatives (CDs) for risk management purpose. Our extensive review of past literatures on 
credit derivatives is described below.  
 
3.1 The use of credit derivatives  
Previous literatures investigate the determinants and the extent of credit derivatives use 
by financial institutions. Minton et al (2009), for example, suggest that although the use of credit 
derivatives has been increased dramatically in recent years, the use has been limited to only a 
few banks. The study finds only 23 large banks out of 395 banks in their sample use credit 
derivatives. However, the amount by which these 23 large banks use credit derivatives exceeds 
the total amount of loan held by these banks by 20%. In search for the reasons behind the limited 
use of credit default contracts, studies by Ashraf et al (2005) and Benendo and Bruno (2009) find 
that the limited use is primarily due to entry barriers, which favor large banks. Since credit 
derivatives are expensive instruments, Shao and Yeager (2007) state that it is beneficial for only 
those banks whose activities are more concentrated to large credit exposures. They propose that 
the large banks are more likely to use credit derivative contracts since they are more likely to 
bear the fixed cost associated with managing credit derivatives and also the cost related with 
pricing these instruments, which requires costly expertise. Carter and Sinkey (1998) do not find 
any evidence to support that bank size is a factor in the extent of derivatives use by banks. 
However, they find evidence that economies of scale are a factor that motivates more than one 
type of derivative use by banks. Ashraf et al (2005), Minton et al (2009) and Hirtle (2009) also 
support the hypothesis that banks that are using credit derivatives also use other forms of 
derivative products. The limited use of credit derivative is also supported by the fact that they 
limit banks from using hedge accounting (Minton, 2009 and Shao et.al., 2007).  
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 More recently, financial institutions have increasingly practiced trading activities of 
derivatives. Numerous previous literatures state that banks are moving away from the traditional 
risk reduction activities with derivatives and orienting their activities towards fee generating 
dealer activities. As found by Minton et al (2009), most of the gross amount of credit derivatives 
banks hold is for dealer activities. Their study on U.S. bank holding companies find that less than 
2% of the total amount of credit instrument held by banks is used for hedging purpose. They also 
conclude that credit derivative used for dealer activities is partially responsible for the recent 
subprime crisis. Shao and Yeager (2007) demonstrate that the protection buyers or the users of 
credit derivatives for hedging purpose decrease total risk and increase capital. Nevertheless, the 
protection sellers are more diverted towards increasing risk and generating additional fee 
income. They conclude that credit derivative act as a flexible instrument which can increase or 
decrease risk depending on the way these instruments are used by banks. Ashraf et al (2005) 
state that credit derivatives allow a profitable trading opportunities and banks that are more 
oriented towards non-traditional sources of income tend to participate more in the credit 
derivative market. Mahieu (2007) ?????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ????
hedging is positively affected by their involvement in trading activities. In addition, more 
profitable banks, as measured net interest margin, tend to be using less credit derivative for 
hedging purpose. Minton et al (2009) and Benendo and Bruno (2009) also find that net buyers of 
credit protection are less profitable. 
 
3.2 C redit derivatives and bank lending 
 Minton et al (2009) and Shao and Yeager (2007) examine the type of loan portfolio held 
by credit protection buyers. Their study finds that the net buyers of credit derivatives are more 
likely to hedge the C&I loans and foreign loans than any other loans. They indicate that the 
market for credit derivatives is most liquid for investment grade firms, foreign banks and foreign 
multinational firms. These corporations are more likely to hold risky C&I loans and foreign 
loans in their portfolio. Therefore, credit derivatives are more likely used as a protection against 
risky loans.  
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 Hirtle (2009) addresses the aspects of credit derivative usage on the banks credit supply 
and do not find any strong evidence to support that the use of credit derivative expands credit 
supply. She suggests that the benefits of the growth of credit derivatives may be narrow and 
limited to large borrowers. In addition, she finds that banks that are active hedgers are likely to 
charge more for the additional amount of credit. However, Godris et al (2006) study banks 
lending behaviour with the development of credit derivative produc??? ??? ????????? ??? ?????????
(2009) findings, they find that the advancement in the credit risk management technique, 
measured by the issuance of at least one collateralized loan agreement (CLO) increases the target 
loan level to approximately 50%. Moreover, Brewer et al (2000) find a positive association 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
   Several studies consider the use of derivatives and its effect on bank capital and 
they come up with mixed results. While Shao and Yeager (2007) argue that both protection 
buyers and sellers increase their capital holdings significantly, Minton et al (2009) argue that net 
protection buyers saves capital by purchasing such credit protection. Ashraf et al (2005) also 
suggest that the participating banks of credit derivatives hold less capital in their portfolio. 
Cabenoyan and Strahan (2001) state that banks that use loan sale as a credit risk transfer tool 
hold less capital. Carter and Sinkey (1998) present a study on the end users of interest rate 
derivatives and find a strong correlation between the end users of interest rate swaps and bank 
capital. Previous studies also examined the link between bank capital and loan rates that banks 
charge to their borrowers. Santos and Winton (2009) find that banks with low capital charge a 
higher rate to their borrowers with low cash flow, but provide a great discount to their clients 
with high cash flow. 
 
3.3 C redit risk transfer instruments 
 Benendo and Bruno (2009) investigate the characteristics of banks using deferent types of 
credit risk transfer instruments. His study concludes that banks with riskier loan portfolios, 
liquidity constraints and higher asymmetric information prefer to sell or securitize loans. In 
addition, large, well-capitalized and internationally active banks with less risky portfolio and 
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lower profitability have a preference for credit derivative protection. Minton et al (2009) claim 
that banks that are using other credit risk management tools, such as loan sale and securitization, 
are also the net buyers of credit derivative protection. Additionally, the paper provides some of 
the reasons why banks are less active towards loan sales market where they can completely 
remove the credit risk from their balance sheet. In one side, lemon problem in the loan sale 
market inspire banks to stay away from the loan sales. On the other hand, relationship banking 
motivates banks to purchase protection and keep loans on their balance sheet. If loans are sold, 
the relationship between the originator of the loan and the borrower would be completely shifted 
to some other party. The author argues that if the relationship is shifted to some other party, the 
borrower might face difficulty with the lender if the lender has less experience with the 
borrower. Moreover, the lender might lose some future benefits from the borrower or would lose 
the implied commitments of relationship based lending. The paper states that the relationship 
based lending plays an important role in C&I loans, agriculture loans and foreign loans. 
However, it does not seem to be an important component in small loans like mortgages, retail 
loans and credit card loans. 
 
 When comparing the characteristics between the participants of loans sale market and the 
net buyers of credit derivative instruments, Benendo and Bruno (2009) find that loan sales or 
securitization markets are preferable to credit derivative markets when banks suffer from higher 
credit risk, higher liquidity constraints and contain more loans in their portfolio. However, credit 
derivative instruments are more favourable for banks with higher capital, more C&I loan and 
with more involvement in trading activities.  
 
3.4 Users and nonusers of derivatives 
 Prior Studies have investigated the usage of financial derivatives for hedging purposes 
and the characteristics of users and nonusers of derivatives (Shanker (1996), Carter and Sinkey 
(1998)). Shanker (1996) shows that banks are effectively using derivative securities for hedging 
purposes. Sinkey and Carter (2000) find that users of interest rate contracts, foreign exchange 
contracts, equity contracts and commodity and other derivatives contracts among US commercial 
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banks are on average 50 times larger than nonuser commercial banks. These user banks have 
higher interest rate risk, higher loan charge offs, more notes and debentures but contain less 
equity capital and have lower net interest margin. Brewer et al (2000) argue that banks that are 
participants of interest rate derivative market increase commercial and industrial lending more 
than banks that do not participate. The study also investigates if the use of interest rate 
derivatives has a relationship with bank failure and do not find any association. This concludes 
that the interest ????? ??????????? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ??????? ????? ??????? ???? ??????????? ?????
supports the finding by Ahmed et al (1997), who state that the users of interest rate derivatives 
have lower accounting interest rate risk exposure. Purnanandam (2006) argues that derivative 
usage reduces the cash flow volatility of banks because the need to adjust lending or borrowing 
activities is much less for user banks than is for nonuser banks. So, the impact of monitory policy 
is much less for user banks as opposed to nonuser banks. Minton et al (2009) argue that net 
buyers of credit protection are less profitable, less likely to hold more capital. Moreover, the 
paper also suggests that if banks have higher deposit and higher liquid assets they are less likely 
to be the net buyers. These buyers contain less agricultural loans but they hold more C&I loans 
in their portfolio. 
 
3.5 Integrated risk management 
 Numerous studies examine the coordinated risk management activities of banks (Carter 
and Sinkey (1998), Miller (1998), Drehmann (2008) and Jarrow et al 1998). Among these 
papers, there is a general conclusion about the necessity for integrated risk management. Using 
net loan charge off as a proxy for credit risk, Carter and Sinkey (1998) find support for the 
hypothesis that banks facing significant amount of credit risk in their portfolio use derivatives to 
manage other risks, particularly interest rate risk. Jarrow et al (2000) use an empirical analysis to 
????? ??? ?????????????? ?????? ??????????? ???? ???????????? ?????? ??????? ????oach in pricing and 
hedging corporate debt and finds the need for a newer model which will include both interest rate 
risk and credit risk for the enterprise wide risk management. Drehmann (2008) provide a general 
framework to assess the joint impact of interest rate risk and credit risk and also come up with 
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the same conclusion that it is essential to jointly assess the interest rate and credit risk for a 
complete risk management. 
 
 ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????net interest 
margin. Ho and Shunders back in 1981 examine the relationship between interest rate risk and 
??????????? ????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????? (1981) and 
investigates the reflection of default risk and interest rat??????????????????????????????????????????
study concludes that while default risk significantly affects net interest margin of money centre 
banks, interest rate risk affects the net interest margin of super regional and regional banks. 
Wong (1997) shows that the net interest margin reacts positively to operating cost, regulation, 
interest rate risk and credit risk.  
 
3.6 The Downside of C redit Derivative Use 
 While many previous studies focus on the characteristics of user banks and their lending 
behaviours, some other studies focus on the downside of using credit derivatives. As suggested 
by Morrison (2005), when banks insure themselves by purchasing credit default contracts, they 
???? ????? ??????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ?????????????????? ??????? ??? ??? ??????? ?nd Minton et al 
(2009) state that the moral hazard and adverse selection problem related with the credit 
derivatives corresponds to a limited use of this instrument. In addition, credit derivative market 
can adversely affect other markets for risk sharing. For example, Duffee and Zhou (2001) state 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of loan sold in the loan sale market. So, banks entering into credit derivative market, along with 
the asymmetric information problem can cause loan sale market to break down. In this case, the 
credit derivative market might not always be beneficial for financial institutions. 
 
 More recently, positive view of the use of credit derivatives has been criticized in many 
studies (Instefjord, 2005, Duffee and Zhou, 2001, Morrison, 2005) and the improper usage of 
credit derivative has been blamed for being partially responsible for recent subprime credit crisis 
(Minton et al, 2009). Instefjord (2005), for example, investigates whether the innovation of credit 
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derivative market destabilizes banking sectors and concludes that the credit derivative market 
???????????????????????????????????ur. The paper also suggests that credit derivatives not only 
enhance risk sharing but also attract further acquisition of risk. Hence, there is a potential treat to 
??????? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??????? ?????????????????? ??????? ????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ???
banking sectors and finds that credit derivative instruments enhance liquidity in normal and crisis 
times. But, the increase liquidity potential in crisis time reduces banks motivation to avoid a 
crisis. This encourages banks to take on additional risk, which leads to a higher probability of 
default. Morrison (2005) states that credit derivative market can reduce welfare by causing 
disintermediation in the market. He also recommends that the reporting requirement for credit 
derivatives can overcome this problem. Duffie (2008) argues that when a bank transfers its credit 
risk exposure it ha??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
risk taking and to exit the relationship with borrowers when needed.  
 
 Cebenoyan and Strahan (2001) conclude that credit derivatives, as advanced risk 
management practices are likely to improve the availability of credit but not to reduce bank risk. 
Some recent studies explore the impact of credit derivatives on loan pricing. Nordan and Wagner 
(2008), for example, observe empirically if credit defaults swap (CDS) market has an impact on 
the rates charged by banks on new loans. There study finds that the credit default swap spread, 
the price on credit derivative, has a strong positive correlation with the pricing of new syndicated 
loans and that the CDS spread explains about 25% of subsequent monthly changes in aggregate 
loan spread between the period 2000 to 2005.Marsh (2006) studies the impact of the 
announcements of new loans in the equity market when lenders are active in the credit derivative 
market. He shows that the equity markets react less to the loan announcements when credit 
derivative is actively used in banks. 
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C H APT E R 4 
H YPO T H ESES 
 
There has been a tremendous growth of the market for credit derivatives. Even though the 
number of BHCs using credit derivatives is small, the notional amount of the usage of CDs by 
these BHCs is enormous. We propose that some BHCs use credit derivatives to hedge credit risk 
exposure, while others sell CDs to generate additional fee income. Also, some BHCs actively 
trade credit derivatives and play the role of market makers. One objective of this study is to 
examine the loan pricing behaviour of users and nonusers of credit derivatives. In addition, we 
compare the loan pricing behaviour of the users of credit derivatives during the years when they 
report CDs and during years when they do not report CDs. 
 
4.1 Determinants of the contractually promised return on loans 
 According to the loan-pricing model (Saunders et al. (2009)), ???????????????????????????
loan rates include loan origination fees, the base-lending rate which serves as a proxy for the cost 
of funds, compensating balance requirement imposed by the Central Bank, and the  credit risk 
premium. Formally, the gross return on a loan can be expressed by the following equation:             1+k  =  1+  pm  +  [  fa  +  (Br  +m)  /  1-­‐[b(1-­‐Rr)]]  
where k denotes the contractually promised return on the loan per dollar lent, Pm denotes the 
profit margin, fa represents the application and other fees charged to the borrowers, Br denotes 
the base-lending rate, m denotes the default risk premium, b represents the compensating balance 
requirement as a percentage of the loan amount that is noninterest bearing and is kept within the 
bank, and Rr denotes the reserve requirements imposed by the Central Bank on financial 
?????????????? ??????? ?????????? ???? ????-???????? ???????????? ??????????? ?? ?????????? ??????????????
weighted average cost of capital used in a loan, and m, the default risk premium are the major 
determinants of loan prices. The credit risk premium is an important factor that affects the 
promised return on a loan. If the credit risk is high, banks usually charge a higher risk premium 
or margin (m) in order to compensate for the default risk. 
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The major goal of this study is to determine the relation between loan prices, measured 
by the interest and fee income per dollar of loans, and the use of credit derivatives at BHCs.  We 
expect that if all else are equal, BHCs that use credit derivatives for hedging should be able to 
lower their loan prices, as the default risk component of the expected return on loans would be 
low. Thus, if the users of credit derivatives are hedging credit risk their risk premiums must be 
lower in comparison to non-users. However, if these BHCs use credit derivatives to book and 
hedge higher risk loans that they would not book without CDs then their loan rates and the 
riskiness of their portfolios will be higher in comparison to the nonusers. In this case, we will 
find a positive relation between CDs use and loan prices and default risk. Moreover, it is also 
possible that there will not be any association between the purchase of CDs and BHCs loan 
pricing. If BHCs purchase CDs protection only to manage the excessive risk they have taken but 
do not demand a higher loan rate, we would find no significant association between the two. 
In contrast, we propose that the relation between loan prices and CDs sold should be 
negative or insignificant depending on the circumstances of the BHC. A BHC may sell credit 
derivatives to another BHC if its loan portfolio is low risk. This action is appropriate when the 
BHC is comfortable with a given level of default risk but, for some reason or another, its loan 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be low and the BHC would be trying to increase income from selling protection to BHCs that 
have high default risk. In this case, the BHC would be reporting high level of CDs sold to others 
and low income per dollar of loans. On the other hand, a BHC may sell credit derivatives to 
another BHC as part of a speculative strategy to generate additional income. Under this scenario, 
?????????? ???????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ????????? ??? ????????????? ???? ?????
default risk profile. In this case, the BHC would be reporting high level of CDs sold to others and 
perhaps high return on assets but the income per dollar of loans would not be different from the 
comparable rate at nonuser BHCs. 
Another goal of our study is to find, for both users and non-users of credit derivatives, 
how the interest and fee income generated by the BHCs is affected by the risk of default of their 
clients. We hypothesize that when banks make risky loans, they will pass the cost of defaults to 
the borrowers by increasing the default risk premium on all loans of the same risk class.  
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A third goal of this study is to investigate whether the use of CDs affects the supply of 
funds or loan rates differently for different types of loans banks hold in their portfolios.  
In summary, our hypothesis may be stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The relation between a BHCs interest and fee income per dollar of loans and the 
level of credit derivatives used for hedging is negative 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The relation between a BHCs interest and fee income per dollar of loans and the 
level of credit derivatives sold is negative 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The relation between a BHCs interest and fee income per dollar of loans and the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Credit derivatives allow BHCs to make riskier loans to real estate, consumer, 
commercial and industrial, agricultural, and foreign loans.  
  
4.2 Determinants of the interest and fee income per dollar of loans  
 
C redit Risk 
 Credit risk is an important determinant of loan pricing for BHCs. Brewer et al (2000) 
?????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ??????? ????? ?? ???????? ??? ????? ????????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ??????????
strength. Previous studies (Brewer et al (2000) and Sharpe and Acharya (1992)) find a significant 
and negative relationship between C&I loan charge off and C&I loan growth. On the contrary, 
we look at the association between credit risks, a measure of loan quality, and its effect on the 
loan pricing. The higher the default risk a bank faces, the higher should be the risk premium a 
bank would charge to its borrower. So, the price of loans should also be higher. 
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C redit Derivatives 
 We are mainly interested to find out whether the use of credit derivatives enables banks 
to charge a lower rate to their borrowers. Nowadays, banks are able to manage their loan 
portfolio more efficiently with the use of credit derivatives. Credit derivatives provide a new 
source for banks to generate fee income by engaging in trading activities and also enable banks 
to reduce regulatory capital (Shao and Yeager, 2007). According to Minton et al (2009), the net 
buyer of credit instruments holds more C&I loans and originate foreign-denominated loans. Also 
suggested by Brewer and Moser (2000), banks experience a greater growth in commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loan portfolio when they are active participants in the interest rate derivative 
market. Our objective is to analyze the interest and fee income that banks generate from the 
loans. Norden and Wagner (2008) state that there is a strong connection between the prices for 
credit default swap (CDS) and the loan rates charged by banks as they are both driven by credit 
risk. They argue that since the price of CDS corresponds to the cost of hedging loans, it should 
directly affect loan rate. However, the paper also mentions about the possibility of an inverse 
relationship between the two due to the occurrence of relationship banking. We estimate that the 
users of credit derivatives generate lower interest and fee income per dollar of loan than the 
banks that are not involved in the credit derivative market. Banks can charge a lower price on 
loans when they buy credit derivatives and hedge the credit risk. Banks can also generate a lower 
interest and fee income during the years they sell CDs because banks can only afford to sell CDs 
when they have low risk in their portfolio. They sell CDs in those years because they are better 
able to manage the risk of other banks that have a high-risk profile. 
 
Size 
 Bank size is an important determinant of loan pricing. Large banks can diversify their 
portfolio in several other activities and thus lower the overall bank risk. If the risk is lower, the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Previous literatures find bank size to 
be a key driver behind the participation in the credit derivative market. The use of credit 
derivative is more intense for large firms because of the fixed cost involved in the usage. If large 
banks use more credit derivatives to hedge credit risk exposures from bank loans, banks can 
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lower the loan rate to their customers in order to compete in the market. In addition, large banks 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
activities, banks can afford to charge a lower rate to compete in the market. We expect a negative 
relationship between the bank size and loan rate.  
 
Non-interest income  
 Noninterest income has gained popularity in recent years and a significant portion of 
banks revenue has been achieved through the noninterest income (Rogers, 1998). Previous 
literatures have focused on the relationship between interest income and noninterest income and 
find a positive correlation between the growth rates of the two (Stiroh, 2002, Young and Rice, 
2004). Stiroh (2002) questions if the reliance on noninterest income leads to lower risk and 
higher profitability for banks. His results find limited support towards the argument that 
noninterest income has higher profitability. Moreover, he argues that noninterest income is more 
volatile than interest income. Trading activities is found to be the most volatile noninterest 
income and also is the most important factor in driving the profits down. Using the return on 
asset (ROA) as a measure of profitability of commercial banks in Barbados, Maxwell et al 
??????? ??????? ????? ???????????? ??????? ???? ?? ????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ?????????????? ???? ??? ?????
increases earnings volatility. This finding is also consistent with earlier study  by (Young and 
Rice, 2004) who find that the noninterest income has a positive relationship with profitability 
and earning volatility. The authors also argue that banks that focus more on customer 
relationship and service quality generate more noninterest income. The positive association 
between noninterest income and the loan rate suggests that as banks generate more noninterest 
income by providing more qualitative services and thus are able to maintain a good relation with 
their customers and thus are able to generate a higher interest income. A negative association 
would suggest that as banks increase their noninterest income, they provide a cheaper loan rate in 
order to compete in the market.  
Bank Capital 
 We also investigate the role of bank capital and its influence on loan pricing. Past 
literatures argue ????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????? behaviour. 
21    
According to Boot, Greenbaum and Thakur (1993), banks with low capital tend to make use of 
their borrowers by sacrificing reputational capital in order to preserve financial capital. In 
addition, Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Santos and Winton (2009) study how bank capital 
affects the loan rates that banks charge to their customers and conclude that banks with low 
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????pital. The loan rate that 
these banks charge to their borrowers with low cash flow is relatively high than they charge to 
borrowers with high cash flow; however low capital banks offer greater discounts to borrowers 
with  higher cash flow. Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) find that banks with low capital 
charge higher rates to borrowers with higher switching costs. Consistent with the previous 
literature, we expect that banks with sufficient capital should offer a lower loan rate and banks 
with inadequate capital should charge a higher loan rate. Moreover, if the net buyers of CDs 
lower their capital level, they can pass this additional benefit to customers in terms of lower loan 
rates. 
 
Interest rate r isk and interest rate derivative 
 Interest rate risk is the most common type of risk that arises in the banking industry. 
Banks behaviour in lending long and borrowing short exposes them to interest rate risk (Ashraf 
et al 2005). Interest rate risk and interest rate derivative can also impact the loan pricing. Even 
though they might not influence loan pricing directly, there can be indirect effect. In recent 
times, many researchers have looked the interest rate risk and credit risk jointly. This is because 
the unexpected rise in the interest rate risk can cause borrowers inability to repay the loan. If the 
interest rate risk increases, the probability of default increases and thus interest income from loan 
decreases. Thus we expect a negative relationship between interest rate risk and interest income 
per dollar of loan. Moreover, interest rate derivative is a hedging instrument for interest rate risk. 
If banks use interest rate derivative to take precaution against interest rate risk, interest rate risk 
would reduce which would therefore increase the interest income and fee income. Thus, the 
relationship between interest rate derivative and interest and fee income per dollar of loans is 
expected to be positive. 
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C H APT E R 5 
D A T A , V A RI A B L E D ESC RIPT I O N A ND M E T H O D O L O G Y 
 
 In this chapter we describe the data collection process, methodology used in our study 
and how we construct the variables. 
 
5.1. Data: 
 We collected our data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website. We use the 
dataset Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C) to calculate 
bank specific characteristics. Our sample contains data of the BHCs for each of the year from 
1997 to 2008. The FRY-9C publishes BHC financial data quarterly, as of the last calendar day of 
March, June, September and December. In this study, we use the fourth quarter information as it 
contains the most complete information. The reason we start our study period from 1997 is that 
the FRY-9C starts to report information on the notional amount of credit derivatives from the 
year 1997. 
 
 We face several challenges while assembling our final data set. First, we find many 
BHCs containing missing information on asset size. We drop these observations from our 
sample. Second, we sometimes find that an item number of a particular variable changes from 
previous years and sometimes the dataset completely stops reporting a variable after several 
years of reporting it. Third, we come across a situation where we saw that one variable has two 
different but very similar names in a particular year but contains the same accounting 
information. When we check the data we find that one has only a few values reported and the 
rests are reported as zero or missing. However, the other one has almost all values reported. We 
manage such situations by choosing the variable with the maximum number of values reported. 
 
Credit derivatives information is also obtained from the FRY-9C reports. In general, 
credit derivative contracts are bilateral contracts between two parties, which allow one party, the 
beneficiary, to transfer credit risk of a loan or a financial asset to the other party, the guarantor. 
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Beneficiaries are the protection buyers and the guarantors are the insurers of credit protection. 
FRY-9C reports the notional amounts of each type of credit derivatives starting in 1997. Starting 
in 2002, FRY-9C also includes the gross positive or negative fair values of all credit derivatives 
into the report. Consistent with previous studies we use the notional values. As stated by Shao 
and Yeager (2007), the notional values are used, as more data is available due to the longer time 
???????? ??? ?????????? ?? ???????????? ????????????? ??? ?????? ????? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ??????????? ??????
could fluctuate from quarter to quarter, which makes it difficult to identify the original purpose 
of using the credit derivative. 
The FRY-9C reports also separate both the notional amount and fair values of CDs by the 
way they are used by the BHCs. The notional amounts or the fair values are reported under 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ion and under ?????????????????????????
BHCs sells credit protection.4 
The credit derivatives included are credit default swaps, total return swaps, credit options 
and other credit derivatives. For the 1997-2005 period, the FRY-9C database reports a single 
item for the beneficiaries of the notional amounts of all credit derivatives. For these years, we 
use the single reported item as the total position in CDs. After 2005, the report starts the practice 
of providing information on the notional amount of each credit derivative separately. For 2006 
and later years, we measure the total exposure to CDs as the sum of all individual credit 
derivatives purchased.  
After compiling the final dataset, we end up with 20,240 US BHC observations. Table 1 
shows how credit derivatives are used by BHCs over the years. The table provides information 
on the number of banks using credit derivatives as buyers, sellers, and users of both (buyers and 
sellers). In addition, the table reports the number of banks not using credit derivatives in each of 
the years in our sample. In particular, we classify a bank as a CDs buyer in a particular year if for 
that year the BHC purchases credit derivative protection but do not sell any CDs protection. 
                                                                                                                          4       In its 2010 financial statements, Citibank states ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
amounts of protection purchased and sold and it may hold the reference assets directly, rather than entering into 
offsetting credit derivative contracts as and when desired. The open risk exposures from credit derivative 
contracts are largely matched after certain cash positions in reference assets are considered and after notional 
amounts are adjusted, either to a duration-based equivalent basis or to reflect the level of subordination in 
tranched ???????????  
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Similarly, we classify a BHC as a CDs seller in a particular year if for that year the BHC sells 
credit derivative protection but do not buy any CDs protection. We classify a BHC as a CDs 
buyer and seller in a given year if for that year the BHC is reporting a position as seller and 
simultaneously reporting a position as a buyer. Finally, we classify a BHC as a non-user if this 
BHC neither buys nor sells credit derivatives.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
As previously stated by Minton et al (2009), a small number of banks use credit 
derivatives. From Table 1, we can see that although the number of banks using credit derivatives 
has increased over time from 19 banks in 1997 to a total of 35 banks in 2008, the total number is 
still small. Starting from the year 2000 to 2006, the number of protection buyers is higher than 
the number of protection sellers. Also, the number of banks that hold positions as both 
guarantors and beneficiaries is higher than the number of banks holding positions as either 
guarantors or beneficiaries. We also observe that starting from 2006, there has been a significant 
drop in the number of user and nonuser banks. This is because of the change in the reporting 
requirements of FRY 9C. Before 2006, BHCs with total consolidated assets of $150 million or 
more were required to file the FRY-9C information. Starting from 2006, the total consolidated 
asset size requirement has been increased to $500 million or more. So, prior to 2001 a large 
number of smaller banks were exempt from reporting the FRY-9C information. The graphical 
representations of the number of banks involved in buying, selling and both are shown in figure 
5, 6, and 7 respectively. 
   [Insert figure 5 here] 
   [Insert figure 6 here] 
   [Insert figure 7 here] 
 
 First, we divide our dataset into two samples. The first sample (non-users group) consists 
of the group of BHCs that did not use credit derivative in the entire twelve years period. We find 
18,942 BHCs observations in twelve years period. From this sample, we separate the largest 100 
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non-user banks of each year and compile a subsample of total 1200 BHC observations. We use 
this sample (non-users) for our analysis.  
 
Our second sample includes those BHCs that use credit derivatives at least once in twelve 
years. These BHCs can use credit derivatives as buyers, as sellers or as buyers and sellers. We 
call these BHCs CD-active. We get total 815 banks in this sample. We find that a few BHCs in 
this sample did not use credit derivatives for the first few years and then start to use them in 
future years. Similarly, few BHCs in that sample use CDs in the first few years but stop using 
them after a few years. From the available information, it is not possible to find out the reason 
.To solve this issue, we include observations of each BHCs from the year they start using credit 
derivatives. After these BHCs gain the capacity to use credit derivatives, they switch their 
positions from buyers to sellers (or vise versa) and in some years just they do not participate in 
the CDs market at all. So, we limit our sample to only those banks that achieve the capability to 
use CDs and yield a total of 518 BHC observations (users group). 
 
Table 2 shows a sample of randomly selected fourteen banks from the users group. We 
can identify these banks by their entity numbers. The shaded area shows the time from when 
BHCs gain the capacity to use credit derivatives and thus the area represents the sample of our 
users group. Also, we can see from the table that after BHCs start using credit derivatives, they 
often flip their positions.  
 
     [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5.2 Variable Construction  
Dependent Variable  
We use the interest and fee income from loans divided by total loans as a proxy for loan 
pricing or for the rate of return per dollar of loans. FRY-9C reports the interest and fee income 
on loans in two categories. They are interest and fee income on loans 1) in domestic offices and 
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2) in foreign offices, Edge and Agreement subsidiaries and IBFs. We add these two categories 
into our calculation and divide it by total loans.  
 
Test Variables  
To test f??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
different measurements of credit risk. First, we use the net charge offs (N C O) as a proxy for 
credit risks. The net charge off is the ratio of the year-end outstanding amount of charge-offs less 
recoveries divided by total loans.  Charge-off on loans and leases represents the amount that is 
charged off against the allowance and recoveries represent the amount that is credited to the 
allowance for collections on loans and leases previously charged against the allowance. The 
charge off (NCO) ratio has been used by previous studies to proxy for credit risk (Bedendo and 
Bruno, 2009; Angbazo, 1997; Ashraf and Altunbas, 2005; Sinkey and Carter, 2000). Moreover, 
Angbazo (1997) uses three other measures as indicators of default risk. These are the allowance 
for loan and lease losses on the balance sheet, non-performing asset, and provision for loan and 
lease losses on the income statement. Based on his measurement, we use the variable A L L , the 
ratio of the allowance for loan and lease losses to total loans to proxy for default risk. Each BHC 
must maintain an allowance for loan and lease losses in their balance sheet to compensate for the 
credit losses from loans and leases. Another proxy we use for credit risk is NPL , the ratio of non-
performing assets to total assets. The BHCs report loans as nonaccrual if the loans (either the 
principle or interest) are in default for a period of 90 days or more. If the ratios NCO, ALL or 
NPL are high for a bank, we can say that this bank has a lower quality loan portfolio. Following 
previous literatures, we also use the ratio R W A , the risk weighted assets divided by total assets, 
as another alternative measure of credit risk. As suggested by Ashraf et al (2005), if the risk 
weightings correctly represent the economic risk of asset categories, risk weighted assets should 
???????????????????????????????????????behaviour. Finally, we use the variable, L LP, the provisions 
for loan and lease losses divided by total loans as another proxy for credit risk.  
In order to investigate the relation between the amount of credit derivative usage and 
BHCs loan pricing behaviour, we create a variable, C D_V O L , to measure the amount of credit 
derivative usage. CD_VOL for a BHC is determined as the difference between the notional 
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amount of CDs for which the BHC is the buyer of credit protection and the notional amount of 
CDs for which the BHC is the seller of credit protection, divided by total loans. 
We explore the relationship between several loan types and their effect on loan pricing in 
the presence of CDs. We measure C & I L N, the commercial and industrial lending activities, by 
adding the C&I lending to US and non US addresses and scaled by total loans. Consumer 
lending, C NSM R L N, is calculated by adding the credit card loans, all other credit provided by 
BHCs for household, family and other personal expenditures not accessed by credit cards and all 
other consumer loans such as student loans, single payment and instalments and scaled by total 
loans. Real estate loans, R L EST L N is the ratio of loans secured by real estate to total loans. 
A G L N is the agricultural loans. We take the ratio of loans secured by agricultural production and 
all other loans to farmers to total loans. F R G N L N is the ratio of loans to foreign governments 
and official institutions to total loans. 
Control Variables 
The variable C AP measures the capitalization of banks and is calculated by total equity 
capital to total asset. We use SI Z E to control for bank size. In line with previous studies, we use 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? 
The variable G AP12 measures interest rate risk and it is used to examine the effect of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????previous literature, we calculate the dollar value 
of G AP12 as: 
Dollar Gap = Earning assets that are repriceable within 1 year or mature within 1 year  
- Interest-bearing deposit liabilities that reprice within 1 year or mature within 1 year 
-Long-term debt that reprices within 1 year 
- Variable rate preferred stock  
-Long-term debt that is scheduled to mature within 1 year  
- Foreign office time deposits with a remaining maturity of 1 year or less.  
Then, G AP12 is determined as the ratio of Dollar GAP12 to total assets. However, with the 
available information from FRY-9C, we can only calculate the short-term interest rate risk.  
 
28    
The variable, IRD, which is the ratio of interest rate derivatives used for purposes other 
than trading to total assets, captures the relationship between interest rate derivatives and loan 
rates. Interest rate derivatives is reported in FRY-9C as the total gross notional amount of interest 
rate derivative contracts held for trading and held for purposes other than trading. Following 
previous studies, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
derivatives used for hedging purposes. There is no way for us to separate the non-trading 
activities between hedging and speculation. Until December 2000, the FRY-9C database reports 
the item derivatives used for non-trading purposes in two subsections: derivatives that have been 
marked to market and derivatives that have not been marked to market. From the year 2000 and 
onwards, the above subsections are no longer available and the entire amount is being reported as 
one item. In order to be as accurate as possible in our measurements, we take the sum of the two 
subsections of the earlier periods (1997-2000) and treat this sum to be equivalent to the item 
???????????????? ??????????????????? ????? ????????? ???? ?????????????????????????????? ???????? ????
variable interest rate derivatives used for hedging by total assets to calculate the ratio, IRD . 
 
We also measure N O NIN T , the ratio of non-interest income to total asset in order to 
capture the effect of non-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-interest 
income includes income from items such as fiduciary activities, trading revenue, investment 
banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions, venture capital revenue, 
net securitization income, and insurance commissions and fees. Finally, we add year dummies 
for each of the years from 1998 to 2008, holding 1997 as the base year.  
Table 3 shows the definition of each of the variables we use in our study. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3 Methodology 
 
We use linear regression to test the relationship between loan pricing and default risk. 
The model may be stated as: 
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Loan_intit = ?0  ???1 NCOit ???2 SIZEit ???3 NONINTit ???4 GAP12it ???5INTRD it + 
?6 CAPit + YEARit ???it  
(1) 
 
Where   Loan_intit = interest and fee income per dollar of loans of bank i at time t 
NCOit   = net charge off by total loans of bank i at time t 
SIZEit = log of total assets 
NONINTit = noninterest income by total assets 
GAP12it = net short term assets/ total assets 
IRDit   = interest rate derivative contracts held for purpose other than trading divided by 
total assets 
CAP = total equity capital/ total assets 
YEARit  = year dummies for each of the years from 1998 to 2008 
We also investigate whether interest and fee income on loans also depends the type of 
loans banks hold into their portfolio.  Shao and Yeager (2007) argue that the protection buyers 
provide more commercial, real estate, and consumer loans but less mortgage loans. However, 
protection sellers do not experience significant change in their loan portfolio. Furthermore, 
Minton et al (2009) argues that the net buyers of credit default contracts hold more C&I loans 
and foreign loans but hold less agricultural loans. We consider C&I loans, consumer loans, real 
estate loans, agricultural loans, and foreign loans in our study and explore the relationship 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????behaviour. 
 
The second model in our study is as follows: 
Loan_intit = ?0 ???1NCOit + ?2  RLESTLNit  ???3  C&ILNit  ???4  CNSMRLNit  ???5  
FRGNLNit  ???6  AGLNit   ???7SIZEit ???8NONINTit ???9GAP12it ???10 
INTRD it ???11CAPit + YEARit ????it (2) 
 
Where  RLESTLNit  = loans secured by real estate / total loans 
C&ILNit = commercial and industrial loans/ total loans  
CNSMRLNit  = consumer loans/ total loans 
FRGNLNit = foreign loans / total loans 
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AGLNit   = agricultural loans/ total loans 
 All other variables are as defined in Equation (1). 
We test for the relation between the amount of credit derivative usage and interest and fee 
income per dollar of loans. We apply the following regression model: 
Loan_intit = ?0  ???1CD_VOLit ???2NCOit +  ?3RLESTit  ???4C&Iit  ???5CNSMRit  ???6FRGNLit  
???7AGLit   ???8SIZEit ???9NINTit ???10GAP12it ???11INTRD it ???12CAPit + 
?13YEARit ????it (3) 
 
Where CD_VOLit = (CDs beneficiary ? CDs guarantor) / total loans  
For all above models, we apply the five different measures of credit risk that are 
described earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31    
C H APT E R 6 
R ESU L TS 
This chapter presents results of the empirical analysis corresponding to the loan pricing 
behaviour of the users and the non-users of credit derivatives.  
 
6.1 Summary Statistics, t stats and correlations: 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-users groups 
respectively.  Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for several variables and compares the 
results between users and non-users.  The summary statistics of the users group is based on total 
463 Bank Holding Companies fourth quarter observations from the period 1997 to 2008. The 
total number of BHC observations for the non-users group is 1007. We can see from tables 4A 
and 4B that on average, interest and fee income per dollar of total loan is higher for the nonusers 
of credit derivatives than the users. Interest and fee income on loan (loan_int) is on average 6.3% 
of total loan for the users and 6.9% of total loan for the non-users of credit derivatives. The 
difference is also statistically significant at 1 percent significant level. The figures tell us that 
users of credit derivatives have well diversified portfolio and they also generate income from 
other non-traditional sources. The users BHCs are also significantly higher than the nonusers. In 
addition, if we observe the loan ratio (total loan/total asset) of the two groups, we see that the 
nonusers have significantly higher loan ratio than the users. So, nonuser banks are more oriented 
towards the traditional lending activities. Minton et al (2009) find that net buyers of CDs have 
significantly lower loan ratio than all other banks that are non-participants of credit derivatives. 
Benendo et al (2009) also suggest that the net buyers have significantly lower loan ratio than 
other banks that participate in the loan sale/ securitization process to transfer credit risk. Net 
charge off (NCO) between the users and nonusers group is not statistically significant. However, 
we notice that the minimum value for the NCO is negative which suggests that recoveries from 
previous bad loans are higher than the charge offs in some years. Non-users of credit derivatives 
also obtain more on balance sheet hedging by holding more allowance for credit losses per dollar 
of total loans.  
 
32    
[Insert Table 4A here] 
[Insert Table 4B here] 
 
As seen from table 5 that on average, users have .85% of total loan in the form of 
allowance. However, nonusers have on average .98% of total loan in form of allowance. The 
difference between the average of the two is statistically significant at 1% significance level. The 
twelve-month maturity mismatch between short term assets and liabilities is not statistically 
different between the two groups but the interest rate derivative use for purpose other than 
trading is significantly higher for the users than the non users.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The result supports the argument made by Hirtle (2009) who state that the use of credit 
derivatives is complementary to other forms of financial derivatives used by banks. The results 
can also indicate the risk taking behaviour of banks. Since both groups of banks have the similar 
exposure of interest rate risk but the user banks have a lot more interest rate derivative contracts 
in their portfolio, they might be using interest rate derivative contracts to speculate. We also find 
that the users of credit derivatives have significantly lower capital holdings. The capital holding 
is on average 8.3% of total asset for the users but the average is 9.6% for the non-users. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that the users of CDs have lower capital requirement. Users 
substitute the expensive capital with credit derivatives. If we look at the loan categories of the 
two groups, we observe that both groups have the highest exposure in real estate loans and the 
lowest exposure in the foreign loans. Consistent with previous studies by Minton et al (2009) and 
Benendo et al (2009), we also find that users of CDs hold significantly higher commercial & 
industrial loans and foreign loans in their portfolio. We also find that the non-user banks hold 
significantly higher consumer loans, real estate loans and agricultural loans. Our finding is 
consistent with previous literatures that conclude that the credit derivative buyers hold more 
risky loans since they are better capable of managing these loans. 
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 Table 6A and 6B shows the correlations among all variables used in our study for the 
user and non-user group respectively. We do not see any concern related to the correlations 
between several variables. 
     [Insert Table 6A here] 
     [Insert Table 6B here] 
 
6.2 Regression results 
We present our empirical findings in this section. Our dependent variable is the interest 
and fee income per dollar of loan (loan_int), which we can also state as loan pricing. Our motive 
is to analyze the relationship between the use of credit derivatives and its effect on the interest 
and fee income per dollar of loans.  
6.2.1 The relation between interest and fee income per dollar of loans and default r isk , and 
loans to various categories 
 Table 7A and 7B analyze the relationship between the risk of default, as measured by five 
risk variables in regression model (1) through model (5), and the price on loans. Overall, the 
results of table 7A suggest that the users of credit derivatives, after they start using CDs, on 
average charge a higher price on loans as the risk of default increases. The coefficients for credit 
risk variables are significant and positive at 1% significant level in all five models. The result 
explains our third hypothesis that suggests that the interest and fee income per dollar of loans or 
the loan price is positively related with the risk of default. The relation between loan price and 
credit risk is positive supporting the fact that the higher the risk associated with banks lending, 
the higher the risk premium charged to the loan price in order to compensate for the additional 
risk that the banks carry on their book. After including several loan categories into the regression 
model in table 7B, the relationship between loan price and the default risk is still unchanged. In 
table 7B, we also test whether the types of loans user banks make also affects the loan pricing. 
Throughout all five models we find that, as banks increase their lending in real estate, 
commercial and industrial (C&I), consumer and agricultural sectors, their interest and fee income 
also increase. In other words, CDs users banks charge a higher price to real estate, C&I, 
34    
consumer and agricultural loans relative to institutional and all other loans. The result explains 
our final hypothesis. 
 In both tables, 7A and 7B, size is found to be negative and significantly related to loan 
price. The results indicate that the smaller banks charge a relatively higher price on loans. As the 
size of banks increases and thus the portfolio becomes well diversified, banks can afford to 
charge a lower rate on loans to borrowers.  We also find a negative relationship between GAP12 
and loan price. On average, we see that the GAP12 is positive (from table 4A). So, if the 
maturity gap is positive and the relationship between the two is negative, it means that the 
interest rate decreases over the time period. If interest rate increases but still we find the interest 
income decreases, that suggests banks use of interest rate derivative for hedging purpose. We 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
significant relationship with banks capital and loan pricing. 
      
     [Insert Table 7A here] 
     [Insert Table 7B here] 
 
 In the next two tables, table 8A and 8B, we analyze the group of BHC observations who 
did not use credit derivatives in the twelve year sample period (non-users). Table 8A presents 
regression results testing the relationship between interest and fee income per dollar of loans and 
default risk. We find similar results that we find in the user group. The higher the default risk, 
the higher the price banks charge to their clients. The positive relationship between the two in 
both user and non-user groups suggests that banks are risk averse in general when pricing loans. 
We add the loan categories into our regression models in table 8B (non users group). We find 
that nonusers charge a significantly higher price to consumer loans (except for model 2 where we 
use risk weighted asset as a proxy for credit risk) and agricultural loans but charge a significantly 
lower price to foreign loans (except for model 4 where we use allowance as a measure of default 
risk). If we look back to table 4B, the bank specific characteristics of the non-users, we notice 
that this group of banks has the lowest investment in foreign loans. So, it can be possible that 
they are choosing the safest foreign clients or it is also possible that the cost of funds for these 
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foreign loans is lower. Finally, noninterest income (NONINT), interest rate risk (GAP12), 
interest rate derivative (INTRD) and capital do not seem to have a significant impact on bank 
loan pricing for the non users of credit derivatives. 
     [Insert Table 8A here] 
     [Insert Table 8B here] 
 
6.2.2. The effect of C D use on interest and fee income per dollar of loans of default risk and 
of several loan categories across users and nonusers 
 
 Next, we analyze the difference between the loan pricing between the users and non-users 
of credit derivatives (Table 9A). We create a dummy variable; DUM_USR to separate between 
the users and nonusers of CDs. DUM_USR variable takes the value of 1 if BHCs are the users of 
CDs and 0 if they are nonusers. The coefficient of the DUM_USR is negative and significant in 
all regression models (except in model 4), stating the fact that the users charge a relatively lower 
price than the nonusers. The benefit of using credit derivatives must be higher than the cost of 
using CDs. So, the additional benefit is passed on to the borrowers of these user banks. As 
suggested by previous studies, the buyers of credit derivatives hold less capital. Also seller banks 
and banks involved in both buying and selling generate fee income by selling or by trading credit 
derivatives. Moreover, the seller banks have low risks in their portfolio. Size also plays an 
important role in this matter. The user banks are a lot larger in size than the nonusers. So, user 
banks are more diversified and generate additional income from other non-traditional sources. 
So, user banks can afford to charge a lower rate to their borrowers. Table 9B examine the 
interaction between the risk variables and the dummy variable DUM_USR to see what happens 
to loan pricing when users increase the risk of default by each additional unit. However, except 
for model 3, we do not find a significant association behind the fact that user banks increase their 
loan pricing as they experience additional credit risk. 
 
     [Insert Table 9A here] 
                [Insert Table 9B here]  
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 Table 9C is designed to show how the users of credit derivatives price their various loan 
categories in relation to the pricing of non-users. The table shows that the interest and fee income 
per dollar of loans of CD users is on average lower than that of non-users. This result may be 
interpreted in two ways. It may mean that users of credit derivatives are protecting themselves 
from the risk of default by passing this risk to the protection sellers and they are passing the 
savings from the default protection to borrowers. Therefore, they are able to offer loans at lower 
rates per unit of risk. Alternatively, it may be that CD users are concentrating on lower risk loans 
hence their income per dollar of loans is lower. Considering the coefficients of the variables that 
represent the interactions between the user dummy and the loan categories supports the later 
interpretation. It shows that within the CD user group the presence of real estate, commercial and 
industrial loans, and consumer loans significantly increases the interest and fee income per dollar 
of loans. This observation may suggest that the CD users are using CDs to book higher risk and 
higher yield real estate, industrial and commercial loans, and consumer loans. The impact of CD 
use on foreign loans is positive but less significant while the impact on agriculture loans is 
insignificant. Overall, these results may suggest that CDs are increasing the supply of funds for 
real estate, commercial and industrial, and consumer loans, and perhaps increasing the supply to 
international borrowers. However, they have no impact on the supply for agriculture loans. 
 
[Insert Table 9C here] 
 
6.2.3 The impact of interest and fee income per dollar of loans for the users during the 
years they use C Ds versus the years when they do not use C Ds 
 
 Table 10 contains results to examine the impact of the amount of credit derivative use on 
loan pricing. CD_VOL, measured by the difference between the amount of CDs purchase and the 
amount of CDs sold, scaled by total loan, proxies the net volume of credit derivative usage. The 
result of table 10 shows a marginal increase in the price of loans when the volume of CDs uses 
increase. The result also indicates that the notional amount of CDs purchase is higher than the 
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notional amount of CDs sold. The coefficients are significant at 10 percent significant level. So, 
the increase in the amount of credit derivatives usage comes at higher price. So, the cost of using 
derivatives is actually passed on to borrowers in the form of higher price on loan. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Our next motive is to investigate the loan pricing behaviour of the users of CDs for the 
years when they use credit derivatives and when they do not use CDs. The user group in our 
study includes the observations of BHCs from the years they start using credit derivatives. We 
divide the observations related to the BHCs that are active in the CDs market between four 
subsets: Subset 0 contains all the BHC observations for which the BHC, although CD-active, do 
not report a position in CDs, Subset 1 contains all the BHC observations for which the BHC 
reports a buy-position in CDs, Subset 2 contains all the BHC observations for which the BHC 
reports a sell-position in CDs, and Subset 3 contains all the BHC observations for which the 
BHC reports a buy-position as well as a sell-position in CDs. We use a dummy variable, 
DUM_USR that takes the value of 1 for the years when banks use credit derivatives ( either buy 
or sell or doing both) and 0 for the years when they did not use credit derivatives. The results of 
table 11A support our previous finding that states that the users charge a marginally lower price 
during the years when they use CDs. We can conclude that the years when user banks decide to 
use CDs, they can pass the benefit of using CDs to their clients. The years when banks report 
CDs, they may hold less risky portfolio and sell more CDs than buying them. So, these BHCs 
can charge a relatively lower price in those years. The next table (table 11B) highlights the 
interaction of the default risk and the DUM_USR. In all of the regression models (except for 
model 2) we find significant and positive coefficient of the interaction variables. The 
interpretation of the findings suggests that the years when users report CDs increase their loan 
pricing for additional unit of credit risk. The other interpretation is that banks are risk averse 
even during the years they participate in the CDs market. Our final concern towards the users 
group is to see the effect on loan pricing during the years they buy, sell or buy and sell credit 
derivatives vs. The years when they do not participate in the credit derivative market. Table 11C 
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presents the regression results. B_DUM is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the 
years when the users only buy CDs and 0 for the years when they do not participate in the credit 
derivative market although they are CD active. Similarly, G_DUM is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for the years when the users only sell CDs and 0 for the years when they do 
not participate in the credit derivative market. BOTH_ DUM is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for years when they buy and sell CDs and 0 for the years when they do not use CDs. 
The dummy variable, G_DUM is significant and negative in all five-regression models. We can 
conclude that the years when users only sell credit derivatives, they hold low risk portfolio. The 
users pass the benefit of holding low risk portfolio to their clients by charging them lower 
interest. Another benefit that contributes towards the lower interest is the additional fee income 
that users generate when they sell credit derivatives. The coefficient for B_DUM is also negative 
but insignificant. This analysis shows that for the CD-active BHCs the price on loans during 
years when they report CDs bought is not significantly different from the loan price when they 
do not report positions in CDs. This result suggests that CD-active BHCs that buy CDs 
protection are doing so to reduce some excessive risk they have taken without charging a high 
loan rate to compensate for this risk. They are buying the CDs to manage the additional risk by 
passing it to the seller of the CDs.  
 The coefficient of the BOTH_DUM is not significant which indicates that the years when 
users banks hold both positions in the CDs market charge a price on their loans that is similar to 
the years when these banks do not report CDs.  Perhaps the BHCs that report simultaneously 
CDs bought and CDs sold are selling CDs to generate income and hedging their positions 
through buying offsetting positions.   
[Insert Table 11A here] 
[Insert Table 11B here] 
[Insert Table 11C here] 
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6.2.4. The impact of default risk (with and without the control for loan categories) on C Ds 
bought for hedging, net positive C Ds bought and net positive C Ds sold  
 
 Next, we investigate the relation between CD buying for hedging purposes and the risk of 
default. We use the notional amount of CDs purchased by only the buyers of credit derivatives 
and scale it by total loan (CD_BUY). Our dependent variable for this hypothesis is CD_BUY. 
The results are reported in Tables 12.1 and 12.2. Table 12.1 shows the results when we do not 
control for loan categories. We find that the amount of CDs bought is negatively and 
significantly related to the capital ratio (total equity capital divided by total assets). This result 
indicates that CDs are purchased as protection against default when the capital ratio is lower. We 
do not find any significant relationship between CD bought for hedging and the risk of default. 
Table 12.2 shows the results when we control for loan categories. The ratio of total equity capital 
to total assets continues to be significantly and negatively related to total CDs bought. In 
addition, we find that the presence of commercial and industrial loans is positively and 
significantly related to the use of CDs while the presence of foreign loans is negatively and 
significantly related to CDs bought. These results suggest that CD buyers are hedging 
commercial and industrial loans while the acquisition of foreign loans seems to be reducing the 
need to use CDs. This result suggests that foreign loans may be considered as internal hedging 
instruments or it may be that buyers of CDS are not active in international markets. 
 
     [Insert Table 12.1 here] 
     [Insert Table 12.2 here] 
 
 Next, we examine the relationship between net CD purchase and the risk of default. We 
use only the observations that report net positive difference between the CD bought and CD sold 
(scaled by total loan) as our dependent variable to see the effect of credit risk on the net buying 
position of CDs. The results are reported in Tables 13.1 and 13.2. Table 13.1 shows the results 
when we do not control for loan categories. Similar to our findings in Tables 12.1 and 12.2, we 
find that the net amount of CDs bought is negatively and significantly related to the capital ratio 
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(total equity capital divided by total assets). In addition, we find that the net CDs bought is 
negatively and significantly related to two measures of risk, namely the risk weighted assets 
(RWA) and the allowance for loan losses (ALL). The result for allowance suggests that as banks 
increase the on balance sheet hedging, they keep less off-balance sheet hedging in their portfolio. 
Table 13.2 shows the results when we include loan categories as controls into the regression 
model. It confirms the negative and significant relation between the net positive position in CD 
protection and the capital ratio. In addition, we find that the presence of real estate loans, 
consumer loans, and agriculture loans reduces the size of net positive positions in CDs. It seems 
that BHC that are engaged in buying and selling CDs are likely to have less real estate, 
consumer, and agriculture lending. In both table 13.1 and 13.2 we find that the relation between 
the non-interest income and the net positive position in CDs to be negative and significant. This 
indicates the BHCs are selling CDs to increase the non-interest income but they are maintaining 
some hedging positions.  
     [Insert Table 13.1 here] 
     [Insert Table 13.2 here] 
 
Tables 14.1 and 14.2 consider the relation between the net CDs sold and the independent 
variables. The dependent variable here is the positive difference between CD sold and CD 
purchased which suggests that the observations belong to large BHCs that are actively engaged 
in buying and selling but they have more protection sold than bought. The two tables show that 
the net positive CDs sold is positively but not significantly related to the risk measures. Table 
14.1, which reports the results in the absence of controls for loan categories, suggests that the net 
CDs sold is negatively and significantly related to the non-interest income and capital ratio but 
positively related to the amount of interest rate derivatives held by the BHC. After controlling for 
loan categories, Table 14.2 shows that the relation between the net CDs sold and the non-interest 
income and the capital ratio becomes insignificant while the relation with interest rate derivative 
strengthens. This result suggests that the BHCs that are reporting net CDs sold are using interest 
rate derivatives to hedge their positions in the CD market or to reduce their interest rate risk to 
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open room for taking risk in the CD market. Table 14.2 also shows that the relation between net 
CDs sold is negatively and significantly related to foreign loans and agriculture loans. 
 
     [Insert Table 14.1 here] 
     [Insert Table 14.2 here] 
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C H APT E R 7 
C O N C L USI O N 
 
This paper investigates for BHCs the relation between the usage of credit derivatives and 
the income per dollar of loans for the period 1997 to 2008. First, we compare the users and 
nonusers of CDs. We find that the users report interest and fee income per dollar of assets that is 
significantly lower than the interest and fee income per dollar of assets reported by nonusers. 
This finding may suggest that the BHCs that are using CDs generally have lower risk loan 
portfolios and these portfolios are generating lower income per dollar of assets. In addition, we 
investigate the relation between loan pricing and default risk for both users and nonusers and we 
find that this relation is positive and almost equivalent for users and nonusers. 
We pursue further our investigation of the relation between loan pricing and the use of 
CDs. We divide the observations related to the BHCs that are active in the CDs market between 
four subsets: Subset 0 contains all the BHC observations for which the BHC, although CD-
active, does not report a position in CDs, Subset 1 contains all the BHC observations for which 
the BHC reports a buy-position in CDs, Subset 2 contains all the BHC observations for which 
the BHC reports a sell-position in CDs, and Subset 4 contains all the BHC observations for 
which the BHC reports a buy-position as well as a sell-position in CDs.  We use Subset 0 as the 
base subset and examine the differences among the four subsets. This analysis shows that for the 
CD-active BHCs the income per dollar of loans during years when they report CDs bought is not 
significantly different from the income per dollar of loans when they do not report positions in 
CDs. This result suggests that CD-active BHCs that buy CDs protection are doing so to reduce 
some excessive risk they have taken without demanding a high rate to compensate for this risk. 
They are buying the CDs to manage the additional risk by passing it to the sellers of the CDs.  
In contrast, during the years when CD-active BHCs report CDs sold they also report 
significantly lower income per dollar of assets. This result suggests that CD-active BHCs usually 
sell CDs when they feel that their loan portfolios are low risk and they can afford underwriting 
some risk of default to improve their income. They write CDs to earn fee income.  
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The observations obtained during years when the CD-active BHCs report both CDs 
bought and CDs sold are consistent with our conclusions. For these observations, the income per 
dollar of loans is not significantly different from the income per dollar of loans when they do not 
report positions in CDs.  Perhaps the BHCs that report simultaneously CDs bought and CDs sold 
are selling CDs to generate income and hedging through buying offsetting positions.  This result 
is also consistent with the propositions of previous studies which suggest that the buyers of CDs 
are saving capital when they purchase credit protection and they are passing the cost savings to 
customers. Furthermore, we find that among the users group, as the volume of CDs increases the 
income per dollar of loans also increases. This suggests additional usage of CDs allows users to 
accept risky loans that they would not accept in the absence of CDs. They are initiating these 
high-risk loans to generate higher interest and fee income and at the same time they are using 
more CDs to hedge these risky loans.  
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Table 1: Number of Bank Holding Companies using credit derivatives by year 
CD buyers are the group of BHCs who are only buyers of credit derivatives. CD sellers are the group of 
BHCs who are only sellers of credit derivatives. CD buyers and sellers are the group of BHCs that has 
both buying and selling positions in credit derivatives.  
 
Year Non-users Users CDs buyers CDs sellers CDs buyers and sellers Total Users 
1997 1445 3 6 10 19 
1998 1469 7 5 11 23 
1999 1550 5 9 16 30 
2000 1659 11 9 11 31 
2001 1796 12 6 18 36 
2002 1942 9 8 19 36 
2003 2145 11 4 23 38 
2004 2257 10 4 29 43 
2005 2259 12 7 31 50 
2006 949 13 4 20 37 
2007 928 7 8 21 36 
2008 938 8 4 23 35 
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Table 2: Switching between buy, sell, or both positions for a sample of credit derivative users 
Data in this table is related to a sample of 14 banks randomly selected from the users group. The shaded 
region represents our sample for the users group. Buy, sell, buy & sell and none denote respectively a 
year when the BHC is reporting credit derivatives purchased but none sold, a year when the BHC is 
reporting credit derivative protection sold but none purchased,  a year when the BHC is reporting 
simultaneously credit derivative protection bought and sold and a year when the BHC is not reporting any 
CDs position.   
Entity Year 1997 
Year 
1998 
Year 
1999 
Year 
2000 
Year 
2001 
Year 
2002 
Year 
2003 
Year 
2004 
Year 
2005 
Year 
2006 
Year 
2007 
Year 
2008 
1020201   sell sell buy & sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell    
1020340 sell sell sell sell sell Sell sell buy & sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
1021075  sell           
1026016 buy & sell            
1027004           sell sell 
1032473 buy & sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell buy buy Buy 
buy & 
sell buy 
buy & 
sell    
1033470   sell sell buy & sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell buy   
1033872    buy         
1037115 buy & sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell          
1039502 buy & sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
1042351 buy & sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell     
1049341           buy buy & sell 
1068025   buy & sell 
buy & 
sell buy none 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
buy & 
sell 
1068762     buy none buy buy buy buy   
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Table 3: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Loan Pricing  
Loan _int 
Interest and fee income on loans / total loans =  (interest and fee income on loans 
in domestic offices and in foreign offices, Edge and Agreement subsidiaries, and 
IBFs)/ total loans 
Independent Variables  
C redit der ivative use  
CD_VOL 
(CDs beneficiary- CDs guarantor)/ total loans = (notional amount of CDs for 
which BHCs are the buyers of credit protection ? notional amount of CDs for 
which BHCs are the sellers of credit protection)/ total loans 
abs(CD_VOL) Abs(CDs beneficiary - CDs guarantor)/ total loans 
C redit Risk  
NCO 
Net loan charge offs/total loans = (yearend outstanding amount of charge-offs 
less recoveries)/ total loans 
RWA Total risk weighted assets/total assets  
NPL Non-performing loans/total assets= total nonaccruals of loans/total assets 
ALL Allowance for credit losses/total loans 
LLP Provision for loan & lease losses/total loans  
Interest Rate Risk  
GAP12 
Earning assets that are repriceable within one year or mature within one year ? 
[Interest-bearing deposit liabilities that reprice within one year or mature within 
one year+ Long-term debt that reprices within one year- Variable rate preferred 
stock + Long-term debt that is scheduled to mature within one year + Foreign 
office time deposits with a remaining maturity of one year or less] / total assets 
INTRD Interest rate derivatives contract held for purpose other than trading / total assets 
Non- Interest Income  
NONINT 
Non-interest income/total assets = (income from judiciary activities, trading 
revenue, investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and 
commissions, venture capital revenue, net securitization income and insurance 
commissions and fees/ total assets 
Bank Size 
     SIZE log (TA) 
Capitalization 
     CAP Total equity capital/ total assets 
Loan Category  
LNRATIO Total loans/ total assets 
RLESTLN Loans secured by real estate/total loans 
C&ILN C&I loans(to US and non US addresses)/ total loans 
CNSMRLN Consumer loans/ total loans 
FRGNLN Foreign loans/ total loans 
AGLN Agricultural loans/ total loans 
 
  Table 4A : Descriptive Statistics related to the dependent and independent variables of the users of credit derivative (users group) 
The variables are compiled from data reported in FRY-9C (Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies). The sample period 
contains yearly data and covers the years from 1997 to 2008. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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  Table 4B: Descriptive Statistics of the dependent and Independent variables of the non-users of credit derivative (non-users group) 
The variables are compiled from data reported in FRY-9C (Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies). The sample period 
contains yearly data and covers the year from 1997 to 2008. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Table 5:  T-tests of the significance of the differences in means of the variables: users versus nonusers 
All variables are defined in Table 3. Note: ***, **, and * indicate respectively statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 level respectively 
Variable Definition 
C D_USE RS      
Mean 
C D_N O N-USE RS 
Mean t-stats   
Dependent Variables           
Loan Pricing           
Loan _int 
interest and fee income on loans / total 
loans 0.0637 0.0713 -8.5909 *** 
Profitability           
ROA Net income/ total assets 0.0089 0.0110 -3.9935 *** 
Independent Variables           
Credit Risk           
NCO Net loan charge offs/total loans 0.0059 0.0053 1.6090   
RWA Total risk weighted assets/total assets 0.6653 0.6083 3.8126 *** 
NPL Non-performing loans/total assets  0.0056 0.0054 0.3467   
ALL Allowance for credit losses/total loans  0.0085 0.0098 -5.047 *** 
LLP 
Provision for loan & lease losses/total 
loans 0.0069 0.0064 1.0061   
Interest Rate Risk           
GAP12 
Difference between short term assets and 
liabilities/ total assets 0.1398 0.1348 0.516   
intRD 
Interest rate derivatives used for 
hedging/total assets 0.2278 0.0749 9.094 *** 
Non- Interest Income           
NONINT Non-interest income/total assets 0.021 0.022 -0.294   
Bank Size           
SIZE log (TA) 17.5672 16.1110 14.527 *** 
Capitalization           
CAP Total equity capital/ total assets 0.083 0.096 -6.2820 *** 
Loan Category           
LNRATIO Total loans/ total assets 0.5714 0.6335 -6.8983 *** 
RLESTLN Loans secured by real estate/total loans 0.5255 0.6119 -7.548 *** 
C&ILN 
C&I loans (to US and non US addresses)/ 
total loans 0.2416 0.1842 7.8563 *** 
CNSMRLN Consumer loans/ total loans 0.1000 0.1244 -4.444 *** 
FRGNLN Foreign loans/ total loans 0.0014 0.0003 6.356 *** 
AGLN Agricultural loans/ total loans 0.0055 0.0082 -3.434 ***  
 
    
Table 6A : Correlations among variables of the C D users group 
All the variables except size are expressed as ratios. Loan_int is the ratio interest and fee income on loans to total loans. NCO represents net loan 
charge off scaled by total loans. RWA equals the ratio of risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets. LLP is provision for loan and lease losses by 
total loans. ALL is the allowance for credit losses scaled by total loans. NPL measures non-performing loans by total assets.CAP equals the ratio of 
total equity capital by total assets. GAP12 represents the difference between short-term assets and liabilities and scaled by total assets. INTRD equals 
the interest rate derivatives for non-trading purpose scaled by total assets. NONINT is the ratio of non-interest income to total assets. Several loan 
categories include 1) RLESTLN (real estate loans/TL), AGLN (agricultural loans/TL), C&ILN (commercial and industrial loans/TL), CNSMRLN 
(consumer loans/TL) and FRGNLN (foreign loans/ TL) 
 
L O A N_
IN T N C O R W A L LP NPL A L L C AP G AP12 IN T RD
N O NI
N T SI Z E
R L EST
L N A G L N C & I L N
C NSM
R L N
F R G
N L N
L O A N_IN T 1.00
N C O 0.20 1.00
R W A 0.21 -0.02 1.00
L LP 0.18 0.91 0.00 1.00
NPL 0.13 0.49 0.14 0.58 1.00
A L L 0.30 0.50 0.52 0.57 0.56 1.00
C AP -0.01 -0.13 0.34 -0.09 0.04 0.20 1.00
G AP12 -0.10 0.13 -0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.10 -0.19 1.00
IN T RD 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.16 1.00
N O NIN T 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.03 -0.15 -0.16 0.02 0.19 0.21 1.00
SI Z E -0.07 0.36 -0.01 0.27 -0.04 -0.01 -0.25 0.24 0.36 0.32 1.00
L NR A T I O 0.23 -0.07 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.55 0.40 -0.11 0.06 -0.30 -0.35
R L EST L N 0.03 -0.28 0.00 -0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.25 -0.12 -0.01 -0.26 -0.48 1.00
A G L N 0.13 -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 -0.20 -0.07 -0.17 -0.34 0.08 1.00
C & I L N 0.11 0.07 0.34 0.01 -0.01 0.26 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.06 0.15 -0.65 -0.04 1.00
C NSM R L N 0.18 0.40 -0.10 0.35 0.01 0.22 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.41 -0.13 -0.05 -0.21 1.00
F R G N L N 0.06 0.09 -0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.21 0.13 0.16 0.31 -0.36 -0.10 0.20 0.07 1.00  
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Table 6B: Correlations among variables of the C Ds non-users group 
All variables except size are expressed as ratios. Loan_int is the ratio interest and fee income on loans to total loans. NCO represents net loan charge 
off scaled by total loans. RWA equals the ratio of risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets. LLP is provision for loan and lease losses by total loans. 
ALL is the allowance for credit losses scaled by total loans. NPL measures non-performing loans by total assets. CAP equals the ratio of total equity 
capital by total assets. GAP12 represents the difference between short-term assets and liabilities and scaled by total assets. INTRD equals the interest 
rate derivatives for non-trading purpose scaled by total assets. NONINT equals non-interest income to total assets. Several loan categories are 
examined including 1) RLESTLN (real estate loans/TL), AGLN (agricultural loans/TL), C&ILN (commercial and industrial loans/TL), CNSMRLN 
(consumer loans/TL) and FRGNLN (foreign loans/ TL) 
 
L O A N_IN T N C O R W A L LP NPL A L L C AP G AP12 IN T RD N O NIN TSI Z E
R L ES
T L N A G L N C & I L N
C NS
M R L
N
F R G
N L N
L O A N_IN T 1.00
N C O 0.31 1.00
R W A 0.15 0.24 1.00
L LP 0.27 0.94 0.20 1.00
NPL -0.01 0.57 0.12 0.64 1.00
A L L 0.20 0.58 0.54 0.59 0.50 1.00
C AP 0.08 0.09 -0.06 0.12 -0.08 -0.13 1.00
G AP12 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.10 1.00
IN T RD 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.09 1.00
N O NIN T 0.20 0.17 -0.05 0.18 -0.09 -0.14 0.86 0.18 0.04 1.00
SI Z E -0.06 0.14 0.24 0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.11 1.00
R L EST L N -0.24 -0.19 -0.10 -0.13 0.18 -0.06 -0.23 -0.31 -0.06 -0.37 -0.17 1.00
A G L N 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.14 1.00
C & I L N 0.05 0.01 0.22 0.01 -0.06 0.18 -0.06 0.19 0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.56 0.06 1.00
C NSM R L N 0.23 0.27 0.05 0.19 -0.12 0.11 0.34 -0.03 -0.02 0.44 0.13 -0.51 0.06 -0.07 1.00
F R G N L N -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 1.00
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Table 7A : The relation between interest and fee income per dollar of loans and default risk (User group)  
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge offs/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL 
(LLP, model 5). All variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture 
the time dependence variation of loan pricing a, 
 
  Independent Variables (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O 1.032         
  (5.447) ***         
R W A  0.014        
   (3.318) ***       
NPL   0.691      
    (4.329) ***     
A L L    1.199    
     (7.134) ***   
L LP     0.720  
      (4.879) *** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  
  (-5.782) *** (-3.550) *** (-3.017) *** (-3.908) *** (-5.248) *** 
N O NIN T 0.004  0.006  0.038  0.071  0.019  
  (0.064)  (0.093)  (0.622)  (1.163)  (0.322)  
G AP12 -0.010  -0.007  -0.011  -0.008  -0.011  
  (-2.778) *** (-1.656) * (-2.586) *** (-2.210) ** (-2.983) *** 
IN T RD 0.007  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.006  
  (3.673) *** (3.379) *** (2.529) ** (2.260) ** (3.547) *** 
C AP 0.015  -0.026  0.000  -0.045  0.009  
  (0.429)  (-0.763)  (-0.013)  (-1.446)  (0.265)  
C 0.112  0.094  0.097  0.094  0.108  
  
  (19.609) *** (15.838) *** (17.143) *** (18.327) *** (19.448) *** 
            
F ixed Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included Observations 518 467 518 518 518 
R-squared 0.52 0.412 0.455 0.491 0.5 
Adjusted R-squared 0.504 0.39 0.436 0.473 0.483 
F-statistic 31.894 18.532 24.508 28.34 29.454 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 0 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 7B: The relation between interest and fee income per dollar of loans, default risk , and loans to various 
industr ies (User group)  
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL 
(LLP, model 5). All variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture 
the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
 
  Independent Variables (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O 0.894          
  (5.480) ***         
R W A  0.014        
   (3.347) ***       
NPL   0.653      
    (5.372) ***     
A L L    0.920   
     (5.099) ***   
L LP     0.544  
      (4.675) *** 
R L EST L N 0.030  0.022  0.026  0.023 0.026  
  (5.912) *** (4.475) *** (5.211) *** (4.436) *** (5.086)***  
C & I L N 0.028  0.018  0.027  0.016 0.026  
  (4.169) *** (2.569) ** (4.031) *** (2.162) ** (3.763) *** 
C NSM R L N 0.054  0.074  0.073  0.058 0.059  
  (4.751) *** (6.502) *** (6.603) *** (4.444) *** (5.210) *** 
F R G N L N 0.064  0.062  0.023  0.144 0.095  
  (0.314)  (0.275)  (0.105)  (0.658)  (0.443)  
A G L N 0.073  0.077  0.101  0.083 0.070  
  (2.426) ** (2.543) ** (3.359) *** (2.728) *** (2.321)** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  
  (-5.467) *** (-5.065) *** (-3.887) *** (-3.862) *** (-5.093) ** 
N O NIN T 0.100  0.099  0.142  0.142  0.110  
  (1.724) * (1.564)  (2.193) ** (2.224) ** (1.760) * 
G AP12 -0.006  -0.003  -0.006  -0.005  -0.007  
  (-1.765) * (-0.793)  (-1.550)  (-1.255)  (-1.821) * 
IN T RD 0.004  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.004  
  (2.199) ** (2.715) *** (1.645)  (1.340)  (2.260) ** 
C AP -0.029  -0.064  -0.043  -0.068  -0.031  
  (-0.849)  (-1.972) ** (-1.315)  (-2.211) ** (-0.924)  
  
C 0.083  0.081  0.078  0.079  0.085  
  (10.801) *** (10.578) *** (10.019) *** (10.207) *** (10.677) ** 
            
F ixed Year  Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included Observations 518 518 518 518 518 
R-squared 0.605 0.534 0.571 0.572 0.580 
Adjusted R-squared 0.588 0.511 0.551 0.553 0.561 
F-statistic 34.489 23.091 29.895 30.109 31.018 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 8A : The relationship between interest and fee income per dollar of loans and default risk (Non- User group)  
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL 
(LLP, model 5). All variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture 
the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
     Independent Variables (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O 1.198          
  (8.517) ***         
R W A  0.009        
   (3.307) ***       
NPL   0.185      
    (3.677) ***     
A L L    1.260    
     (7.425) ***   
L LP     0.919  
      (5.875) *** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.002  
  (-4.112) *** (-2.351) ** (1.145)  (-1.934) * (-2.764) *** 
N O NIN T -0.012  0.122  0.057  0.058  0.001  
  (-0.451)  (3.054) *** (1.524)  (1.773) * (0.031)  
G AP12 0.001  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  0.000  
  (0.318)  (-1.096)  (-1.727) * (-1.258)  (-0.063)  
IN T RD -0.003  0.001  0.000  -0.002  -0.003  
  (-1.311)  (0.777)  (0.179)  (-1.087)  (-1.339)  
C AP 0.038  -0.039  0.020  0.016  0.027  
  (2.075) ** (-1.922) * (0.866)  (0.836)  (1.470)  
    
C 0.111  0.099  0.070  0.086  0.103  
  (13.202) *** (10.653) *** (6.818) *** (10.155) *** (11.199) *** 
            
F ixed Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included Observations 1200 1031 1200 1200 1200 
R-squared 0.605 0.529 0.376 0.533 0.571 
Adjusted R-squared 0.600 0.521 0.367 0.526 0.565 
F-statistic 106.625 66.901 41.974 79.288 92.711 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 8B: The relation between interest and fee income per dollar of loans, default risk , and loans to various 
industr ies (Non-User group)  
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL 
(LLP, model 5). All variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture 
the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
     Independent Variables (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O 1.039          
  (7.387) ***         
R W A  0.009        
   (3.119) ***       
NPL   0.231      
    (3.978) ***     
A L L    0.984    
     (6.530) ***   
L LP     0.764  
      (5.292) *** 
R L EST L N 0.002  -0.004  -0.010  -0.005  -0.001  
  (0.395)  (-0.515)  (-1.386)  (-0.831)  (-0.115)  
C & I L N 0.001  -0.003  -0.011  -0.010  -0.003  
  (0.137)  (-0.398)  (-1.483)  (-1.465)  (-0.396)  
C NSM R L N 0.022  0.012  0.042  0.024  0.027  
  (3.101) *** (1.527)  (4.862) *** (3.148) *** (3.574) *** 
F R G N L N -0.150  -0.241  -0.141  -0.071  -0.103  
  (-2.731) *** (-3.888) *** (-2.235) ** (-1.211)  (-1.938) ** 
A G L N 0.054  0.068  0.044  0.047  0.057  
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
  (3.199) *** (3.106) *** (1.880) * (2.193) ** (3.102) *** 
SI Z E -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  
  (-4.866) *** (-3.103) *** (-2.359) ** (-3.382) *** (-4.240) *** 
N O NIN T -0.026  0.089  -0.022  0.010  -0.026  
  (-0.861)  (2.099) ** (-0.602)  (0.295)  (-0.875)  
G AP12 0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  
  (0.880)  (-0.977)  (-0.279)  (-0.350)  (0.643)  
IN T RD -0.001  0.003  0.004  0.001  0.000  
  (-0.281)  (1.352)  (2.146) ** (0.472)  (-0.070)  
C AP 0.034  -0.029  0.027  0.021  0.027  
  (1.876) * (-1.388)  (1.325)  (1.088)  (1.478)  
C 0.109  0.103  0.103  0.101  0.109  
    
  (10.787) *** (8.723) *** (8.370) *** (9.007) *** (10.373) *** 
            
F ixed Year  Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included Observations 1200 1031 1200 1200 1200 
R-squared 0.625 0.554 0.502 0.570 0.606 
Adjusted R-squared 0.618 0.544 0.493 0.562 0.599 
F-statistic 89.245 56.822 54.025 70.904 82.417 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 9A : The difference between interest and fee income per dollar of loan across users and nonusers  
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL 
(LLP, model 5). DUM_USR variable takes the value 1 if BHCs are users of CDs and 0 if they are non-users. All other 
variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture the time dependence 
variation of loan pricing a 
  
  Independent Variables (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
DU M_USR -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  
  (-2.387) ** (-2.910) *** (-2.738) *** (-1.481)  (-2.497) ** 
N C O 0.990          
  (8.525) ***         
R W A   0.010        
    (4.087) ***       
NPL     0.254      
      (4.072) ***     
A L L       0.970    
        (7.894) ***   
L LP         0.713  
          (6.388) *** 
R L EST L N 0.012  0.008  0.002  0.004  0.008  
  (2.684) *** (1.417)  (0.315)  (0.955)  (1.874) * 
C & I L N 0.009  0.005  0.000  -0.002  0.006  
  (1.824) * (0.778)  (0.062)  (-0.407)  (1.194)  
C NSM R L N 0.032  0.030  0.052  0.033  0.036  
  (5.162) *** (4.587) *** (7.344) *** (5.294) *** (5.563) *** 
F R G N L N -0.034  -0.135  -0.093  0.019  0.010  
  (-0.383)  (-1.344)  (-0.937)  (0.194)  (0.110)  
A G L N 0.067  0.080  0.057  0.061  0.068  
  (4.562) *** (4.168) *** (2.795) *** (3.261) *** (4.234) *** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  
  (-8.673) *** (-5.306) *** (-6.116) *** (-5.818) *** (-7.949) *** 
N O NIN T 0.005  0.086  0.012  0.045  0.004  
  (0.165)  (2.459) ** (0.358)  (1.475)  (0.154)  
G AP12 0.000  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  0.000  
  (0.153)  (-0.576)  (-0.774)  (-0.590)  (-0.201)  
IN T RD 0.003  0.004  0.005  0.003  0.003  
  (2.431) ** (2.850) *** (3.544) *** (2.193) ** (2.601) *** 
C AP 0.018  -0.028  0.010  -0.002  0.011  
  (1.089)  (-1.595)  (0.597)  (-0.121)  (0.699)  
C 0.094  0.089  0.097  0.087  0.096  
  (15.734) *** (11.712) *** (13.328) *** (13.616) *** (15.551) *** 
  
            
F ixed Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included Observations 1718 1498 1718 1718 1718 
R-squared 0.616 0.534 0.516 0.573 0.597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.611 0.527 0.510 0.567 0.592 
F-statistic 118.284 73.406 78.623 98.660 109.245 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 9B: The impact of default risk on interest and fee income per dollar of loans to total loans across the users 
and nonusers of C Ds  
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL 
(LLP, model 5). DUM_USR variable takes the value 1 if BHCs are users of CDs and 0 if they are non-users. All other 
variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture the time dependence 
variation of loan pricing a 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
  
Independent 
Variables 
(M1) 
R V=N C O    
(M2) 
R V=R W A   
(M3) 
R V=NPL   
(M4) 
R V=A L L   
(M5) 
R V=L LP   
DU M_USR -0.001   -0.007   -0.004   -0.001   -0.001   
  (-0.987)   (-1.815) * (-3.957) *** (-0.692)   (-0.766)   
R V 1.009   0.008   0.220   0.961   0.740   
  (7.634) *** (2.741) *** (4.069) *** (6.814) *** (5.518) *** 
DU M_USR*R V -0.103   0.006   0.368   0.053   -0.133   
  (-0.549)   (1.358)   (3.204) *** (0.270)   (-0.857)   
                
R L EST L N 0.012   0.008   0.002   0.004   0.009   
  (2.686) *** (1.365)   (0.330)   (0.915)   (1.910) * 
C & I L N 0.009   0.005   0.000   -0.002   0.006   
  (1.849) * (0.704)   (0.073)   -0.438   (1.243)   
C NSM R L N 0.032   0.030   0.051   0.033   0.036   
  (5.176) *** (4.597) *** (7.252) *** (5.289) *** (5.552) *** 
F R G N L N -0.031   -0.130   -0.093   0.019   0.011   
  (-0.335)   (-1.298)   (-0.953)   (0.200)   (0.114)   
A G L N 0.068   0.081   0.059   0.060   0.069   
  (4.613) *** (4.203) *** (2.909) *** (3.257) *** (4.298) *** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E  -0.002   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   -0.002   
  (-7.410) *** (-5.272) *** (-5.970) *** (-5.833) *** (-7.188) *** 
N O NIN T 0.004   0.087   0.015   0.046   0.004   
  (0.163)   (2.469) ** (0.441)   (1.479)   (0.145)   
G AP12 0.000   -0.001   -0.002   -0.001   0.000   
  (0.177)   (-0.514)   (-0.835)   (-0.585)   (-0.131)   
IN T RD 0.002   0.004   0.005   0.003   0.003   
  (2.303) ** (3.000) *** (3.540) *** (2.189) ** (2.353) ** 
C AP 0.017   -0.029   0.008   -0.002   0.011   
  (1.076)   (-1.686) * (0.489)   (-0.149)   (0.670)   
  
C  0.093   0.090   0.097   0.087   0.094   
  (14.149) *** (11.347) *** (13.363) *** (13.108) *** (14.289) *** 
                      
F ixed Year E ffect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included 
Observations 1718   1498   1718   1718   1718   
R-squared 0.617   0.535   0.519   0.573   0.598   
Adjusted R-squared 0.611   0.527   0.513   0.567   0.592   
F-statistic 113.418   70.604   76.258   94.507   104.967   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 9C : The effect of CD use on interest and fee income per dollar of loans of several loan categories  
The table presents coefficients estimates of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to 
total loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA(RWA, model 2), non 
performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL(ALL, model 4),and provision for loan and lease 
losses/TL(LLP, model 5). Bank lending activities are classified by several loan categories to see the impact of bank 
lending on loan pricing. DUM_USR variable takes the value 1 if BHCs are users of CDs and 0 if they are non-users. All 
variables used for the regression models are defined in table 2. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to 
capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
  Independent Variables (M1) 
R V=N C O 
  (M2)              
R V=R W A 
  (M3)     
R V= NPL 
  (M4)    
R V= A L L 
  (M5)      
R V= L LP 
  
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
DU M_U -0.023  -0.029  -0.030  -0.020  -0.023   
  (-3.579) *** (-4.058) *** (-4.307) *** (-2.941) *** (-3.440) *** 
Risk Variable (R V) 0.978  0.010  0.257  0.947  0.700   
  (8.547) *** (4.219) *** (4.085) *** (7.522) *** (6.373) *** 
R E A L EST A T E L N 0.004  -0.003  -0.008  -0.003  0.001   
  (0.742)  (-0.457)  (-1.209)  (-0.424)  (0.187)   
R E A L EST A T E L N*DU M_U 0.024  0.026  0.030  0.020  0.023   
  (3.476) *** (3.482) *** (4.080) *** (2.882) *** (3.266) *** 
C_I L N 0.003  -0.003  -0.009  -0.007  -0.001   
  (0.432)  (-0.396)  (-1.243)  (-1.116)  (-0.120)   
C_I L N*DU M_U 0.024  0.025  0.033  0.019  0.025   
  (2.871) *** (2.780) *** (3.810) *** (2.135) ** (2.933) *** 
C O NSU M E R L N 0.024  0.013  0.043  0.026  0.029   
  (3.497) *** (1.635)  (5.028) *** (3.512) *** (3.985) *** 
C O NSU M E R L N*DUM_U 0.023  0.059 *** 0.026  0.025  0.020   
  (1.996) ** (4.618)  (2.051) ** (2.030) ** (1.697) * 
F O RI E G N L N -0.142  -0.233  -0.145  -0.073  -0.106   
  (-2.377) ** (-3.725) *** (-2.312) ** (-1.256)  (-1.857) * 
F O RI E G N L N*DU M_U 0.394  0.318  0.300  0.324  0.408   
  (1.869) * (1.397)  (1.329)  (1.473)  (1.873) * 
A G L O A N 0.058  0.068  0.045  0.050  0.060   
  (3.539) *** (3.137) *** (1.963) * (2.373) ** (3.335) *** 
A G L O A N*DU M_U 0.025  0.020  0.041  0.032  0.020   
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
  (0.831)  (0.648)  (1.262)  (0.982)  (0.640)   
SI Z E -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002   
  (-6.718) *** (-5.707) *** (-4.396) *** (-4.552) *** (-6.140) *** 
N O NIN T 0.006  0.098  0.013  0.047  0.005   
  (0.231)  (2.821) *** (0.397)  (1.548)  (0.195)   
G AP12 0.000  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  0.000   
  (0.058)  (-1.139)  (-0.873)  (-0.725)  (-0.235)   
IN T RD 0.002  0.003  0.004  0.002  0.002   
  (1.531)  (2.756) *** (2.851) *** (1.493)  (1.872) * 
C AP 0.012  -0.036  0.004  -0.007  0.006   
  (0.762)  (-2.162) ** (0.217)  (-0.410)  (0.380)   
C 0.098  0.102  0.101  0.092  0.100   
   (14.854) *** (12.278) *** (12.695) *** (12.424) *** (14.602) *** 
F ixed Year E ffect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Included Observations 1718  1498  1718  1718  1718   
R-squared 0.624  0.556  0.527  0.578  0.604   
Adjusted R-squared 0.617  0.548  0.519  0.571  0.597   
F-statistic 99.932  65.774  67.260  82.781  92.016   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 10: The relationship between the amount of C Ds used and interest and fee income pe r dollar of loans (user 
group)  
The table presents the coefficients of the multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on the net amount of CDs use (CD_VOL), net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted 
assets/TA(RWA, model 2), non performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), 
and provision for loan and lease losses/TL (LLP, model 5). All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is 
included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
  Independent Variables (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5)   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
C D_V O L 0.008   0.008   0.007   0.010   0.009   
  (1.734) * (1.715) * (1.769) * (2.255) ** (1.902) * 
N C O 0.903                   
  (5.512) ***                 
R W A     0.015               
      (3.528) ***             
NPL         0.666           
          (5.359) ***         
A L L             0.978       
              (5.325) ***     
L LP                 0.559   
                  (4.697) *** 
R L EST L N 0.031   0.022   0.027   0.024   0.027   
  (6.360) *** (4.783) *** (5.598) *** (4.829) *** (5.496) *** 
C & I L N 0.029   0.019   0.028   0.016   0.027   
  (4.410) *** (2.661) *** (4.253) *** (2.280) ** (3.995) *** 
C NSM R L N 0.056   0.075   0.074   0.059   0.060   
  (4.846) *** (6.582) *** (6.692) *** (4.497) *** (5.297) *** 
F R G N L N 0.048   0.050   0.006   0.128   0.078   
  (0.228)   (0.215)   (0.027)   (0.574)   (0.356)   
A G L N 0.070   0.073   0.098   0.078   0.066   
  (2.344) ** (2.431) ** (3.308) *** (2.650) *** (2.221) ** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.002   -0.002   -0.001   -0.001   -0.002   
  (-5.481) *** (-5.100) *** (-3.913) *** (-3.924) *** (-5.104) *** 
N O NIN T 0.103   0.100   0.145   0.147   0.113   
  (1.757) * (1.581)   (2.221) ** (2.278) ** (1.789) * 
G AP12 -0.007   -0.004   -0.007   -0.006   -0.008   
  (-1.968) ** (-0.983)   (-1.723) * (-1.465)   (-2.054) ** 
IN T RD 0.004   0.005   0.003   0.002   0.004   
  (2.191) ** (2.755) *** (1.624)   (1.273)   (2.257) ** 
C AP -0.024   -0.061   -0.039   -0.064   -0.027   
  (-0.713)   (-1.867) * (-1.181)   (-2.078) ** (-0.770)   
  
C  0.083   0.080   0.077   0.078   0.084   
  (10.764) *** (10.484) *** (10.012) *** (10.088) *** (10.619) *** 
F ixed Year Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included Observations 518   467   518   518   518   
R-squared 0.608   0.536   0.573   0.577   0.583   
Adjusted R-squared 0.590   0.512   0.553   0.558   0.564   
F-statistic 33.297   22.277   28.835   29.327   30.024   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 11A: The difference between interest and fee income per dollar of loans earned by users of C Ds during years 
when they report C Ds use versus years when they do not report C Ds use 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA(RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL(ALL, model 4),and provision for loan and lease losses/TL(LLP, 
model 5). DUM_USR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for years when BHCs use CDs and 0 for years they do 
not use CDs. All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 to capture 
the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Independent Variables (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
DU M_USR -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  
  (-1.660) * (-1.885) * (-1.945) * (-1.835) * (-1.805) * 
N C O 0.878          
  (5.444) ***         
R W A   0.013        
    (3.166) ***       
NPL     0.635      
      (5.308) ***     
A L L       0.890    
        (4.835) ***   
L LP         0.529  
          (4.605) *** 
R L EST L N 0.029  0.021  0.025  0.022  0.025  
  (5.707) *** (4.278) *** (4.964) *** (4.262) *** (4.889) *** 
C & I L N 0.028  0.019  0.028  0.017  0.027  
  (4.223) *** (2.645) *** (4.098) *** (2.266) ** (3.830) *** 
C NSM R L N 0.055  0.074  0.073  0.059  0.060  
  (4.824) *** (6.523) *** (6.638) *** (4.513) *** (5.294) *** 
F R G N L N 0.055  0.049  0.012  0.130  0.084  
  (0.268)  (0.215)  (0.056)  (0.600)  (0.391)  
A G L N 0.078  0.082  0.105  0.087  0.075  
  (2.456) ** (2.600) *** (3.377) *** (2.786) *** (2.365) ** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
  (-4.149) *** (-3.720) *** (-2.711) *** (-2.868) *** (-3.795) *** 
N O NIN T 0.104  0.103  0.146  0.146  0.114  
  (1.782) * (1.629)  (2.245) ** (2.270) ** (1.817) * 
G AP12 -0.006  -0.003  -0.006  -0.005  -0.006  
  (-1.681) * (-0.712)  (-1.455)  (-1.179)  (-1.729) * 
IN T RD 0.004  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.004  
  (2.161) ** (2.644) *** (1.603)  (1.307)  (2.212) ** 
C AP -0.027  -0.060  -0.040  -0.065  -0.029  
  (-0.758)  (-1.749) * (-1.176)  (-2.000) ** (-0.824)  
  
C  0.082  0.080  0.076  0.078  0.083  
  (10.079) *** (9.891) *** (9.294) *** (9.607) *** (9.960) *** 
            
F ixed Year E ffect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included Observations 518 467 518 518 518 
R-squared 0.607 0.537 0.574 0.575 0.582 
Adjusted R-squared 0.589 0.513 0.554 0.555 0.563 
F-statistic 33.224 22.315 28.913 29.049 29.931 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 11B: The relation between interest and fee income per dollar of loans and default risk: the years when B H Cs 
report C Ds use versus the years when they do not report C Ds use 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans to total 
loans (loan_int) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non performing 
loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL 
(LLP, model 5). DUM_USR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for years when BHCs use CDs and 0 for years 
they do not use CDs. All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 2008 
to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Independent Variables 
(M1) 
R V= N C O 
(M2) 
R V= R W A 
(M3) 
R V=NPL 
(M4) 
R V=A L L 
(M5) 
R V=L LP 
DU M_USR -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.008  -0.005  
  (-2.705) *** (-0.870)  (-3.148) *** (-2.204) ** (-2.771) *** 
Risk Variable (R V) 0.324  0.010  0.294  0.402  0.182  
  (2.006) ** (1.317)  (2.517) ** (1.351)  (1.585)  
DU M_USR*R V 0.613  0.004  0.498  0.570  0.401  
  (3.002) *** (0.481)  (2.797) *** (1.923) * (2.796) *** 
R L EST L N 0.029  0.021  0.025  0.021  0.025  
  (5.723) *** (4.283) *** (4.910) *** (4.179) *** (4.902) *** 
C & I L N 0.029  0.019  0.028  0.016  0.027  
  (4.376) *** (2.644) *** (4.061) *** (2.182) ** (3.943) *** 
C NSM R L N 0.055  0.074  0.072  0.057  0.059  
  (4.858) *** (6.388) *** (6.530) *** (4.355) *** (5.230) *** 
F R G N L N 0.030  0.052  -0.008  0.134  0.070  
  0.147  (0.229)  (-0.037)  (0.617)  (0.329)  
A G L N 0.077  0.080  0.097  0.086  0.073  
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
  2.392 ** (2.629) *** (3.076) *** (2.733) *** (2.298) ** 
SI Z E -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
  (-3.983) *** (-3.629) *** (-2.568) ** (-2.709) *** (-3.648) *** 
N O NIN T 0.111  0.103  0.154  0.148  0.123  
  (1.930) ** (1.627)  (2.351) ** (2.296) ** (1.967) ** 
G AP12 -0.006  -0.003  -0.006  -0.004  -0.007  
  (-1.744) * (-0.684)  (-1.607)  (-1.133)  (-1.800) * 
IN T RD 0.004  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.004  
  (2.210) ** (2.651) *** (1.629)  (1.249)  (2.266) ** 
C AP -0.028  -0.061  -0.043  -0.067  -0.031  
  (-0.790)  (-1.768) * (-1.260)  (-2.032) ** (-0.858)  
C 0.083  0.082  0.079  0.082  0.084  
  (10.160) *** (10.782) *** (9.587) *** (10.705) *** (10.019) *** 
            
 
F ixed Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included Observations 518 467 518 518 518 
R-squared 0.613 0.537 0.579 0.577 0.587 
Adjusted R-squared 0.594 0.512 0.559 0.556 0.567 
F-statistic 32.507 21.349 28.289 28.026 29.206 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
66    
Table 11C: The relation between interest and fee income per dollar of loans and the use of C Ds by buyers, sellers, 
and both buyers and sellers)  
This table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the ratio of total interest and fee income on loans (loan_int) 
on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted asset/TA(RWA, model 2), non performing loans/ TL (NPL, 
model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL(ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease losses/TL (LLP, model 5). 
B_DUM is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for years when BHCs only use CD and 0 for years they do not use 
CD. G_DUM is a dummy variable that take the value 1 for years when the BHCs only sell CD and 0 for years when they 
do not use CD. BOTH_DUM is also a dummy variable that take the value 1 for years when the BHCs buy and sell CD 
and 0 for years when they do not use CDs. All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year 
from 1998 to 2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
  
Independent 
Variables 
(M1)     
R V=N C
O   
(M2)             
R V 
=R W A   
(M3)            
R V= NPL   
(M4)             
R V= A L L   
(M5)             
R V = 
L LP   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
B_DU M -0.002   -0.003   -0.003   -0.002   -0.002   
  (-1.252)   (-1.437)   (-1.512)   (-1.205)   (-1.361)   
G_DU M -0.004   -0.004   -0.005   -0.005   -0.005   
  (-2.432) ** (-2.279) ** (-2.682) *** (-2.538) ** (-2.519) ** 
B O T H_DU M 0.000   -0.001   0.000   -0.001   0.000   
  (-0.034)   (-0.519)   (-0.215)   (-0.531)   (-0.175)   
Risk Variable (R V) 0.875   0.012   0.638   0.871   0.527   
  (5.412) *** (2.849) *** (5.301) *** (4.812) *** (4.575) *** 
R L EST L N 0.029   0.022   0.025   0.023   0.026   
  (5.952) *** (4.647) *** (5.221) *** (4.564) *** (5.136) *** 
C & I L N 0.031   0.022   0.030   0.019   0.029   
  (4.582) *** (2.999) *** (4.463) *** (2.639) *** (4.181) *** 
C NSM R L N 0.053   0.072   0.071   0.058   0.058   
  (4.627) *** (6.304) *** (6.377) *** (4.439) *** (5.089) *** 
F R G N L N 0.002   -0.005   -0.046   0.095   0.031   
  (0.007)   (-0.020)   (-0.211)   (0.430)   (0.145)   
A G L N 0.075   0.080   0.102   0.086   0.072   
  (2.347) **  (2.585) *** (3.294) *** (2.802) *** (2.263) ** 
 C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.002   -0.002   -0.001   -0.001   -0.002   
  (-4.385) *** (-3.777) ***  (-3.240) *** (-3.017) *** (-4.048) *** 
N O NIN T 0.104   0.104   0.146   0.142   0.114   
  (1.792) *  (1.649) ***  (2.269) **  (2.235) **  (1.824) *  
G AP12 -0.006   -0.003   -0.006   -0.005   -0.007   
  (-0.006)   (-0.003)   (-0.006)   (-0.005)   (-0.007)   
IN T RD 0.004   0.004   0.003   0.002   0.004   
  (2.034) **  (2.449) **  (1.497)   (1.204)   (2.078) **  
C AP -0.032   -0.062   -0.046   -0.068   -0.034   
  (-0.918)   (-1.790) *  (-1.356)   (-2.132) **  (-0.983)   
 
C 0.087   0.084   0.082   0.081   0.088   
  (9.799) *** (9.445) *** (9.326) *** (9.289) *** (9.678) *** 
F ixed Year Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included 
Observations 518   467   518   518   518   
R-squared 0.612   0.540   0.579   0.579   0.587   
Adjusted R-squared 0.593   0.514   0.558   0.557   0.566   
F-statistic 31.105   20.696   27.120   27.026   28.015   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 12.1:  The relation between C D bought for hedging and the r isk of default 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the amount of CD purchased for hedging by only the buyers 
of CDs scaled by total loans (CD_BUY) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, 
model 2), non performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for 
loan and lease losses/TL (LLP, model 5). All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year 
from 1998 to 2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
 
  Independent Variables (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5)   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O 0.874                   
  (1.263)                   
R W A     0.105               
      (1.438)               
NPL         1.116           
          (0.917)           
L LP             0.224       
              (0.410)       
A L L                 -1.276   
                  (-0.545)   
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.008   -0.007   -0.007   -0.007   -0.007   
  (-1.696) * (-1.551)   (-1.610)   (-1.581)   (-1.594)   
N O NIN T 0.238   0.265   0.293   0.250   0.191   
  (0.861)   (0.944)   (1.036)   (0.914)   (0.615)   
G AP12 0.047   0.096   0.045   0.052   0.056   
  (1.494)   (2.627) ** (1.398)   (1.640)   (1.798) * 
IN T RD -0.003   -0.011   -0.007   -0.003   -0.001   
  (-0.141)   (-0.546)   (-0.366)   (-0.182)   (-0.038)   
C AP -1.371   -1.548   -1.389   -1.372   -1.300   
  (-4.283) *** (-3.776) *** (-4.344) *** (-4.282) *** (-3.470) *** 
  C 0.285   0.214   0.272   0.278   0.285   
  (2.787) *** (2.214) ** (2.752) *** (2.724) *** (2.966) *** 
                      
F ixed Year E ffect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included Observations 108   99   108   108   108   
R-squared 0.392   0.420   0.394   0.389   0.390   
Adjusted R-squared 0.277   0.298   0.280   0.273   0.275   
F-statistic 3.414   3.447   3.447   3.364   3.391   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
                      
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 12.2:  The relation between C D bought for hedging and the r isk of default with control for loan categories 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the amount of CD purchased for hedging by only the buyers 
of CDs scaled by total loans (CD_BUY) on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, 
model 2), non performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for 
loan and lease losses/TL (LLP, model 5). All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year 
from 1998 to 2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
  Independent Variables (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5)   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O -0.588                   
  (-0.652)                   
R W A     -0.007               
      (-0.111)               
NPL         0.944           
          (0.640)           
A L L             -4.290       
              (-1.269)       
L LP                 -0.721   
                  (-1.050)   
R L EST L N 0.022   0.028   0.023   0.032   0.022   
  (0.520)   (0.664)   (0.551)   (0.736)   (0.516)   
C & I L N 0.154   0.156   0.152   0.187   0.157   
  (2.361) ** (2.108) ** (2.357) ** (2.593) ** (2.429) ** 
C NSM R L N -0.224   -0.226   -0.198   -0.167   -0.218   
  (-1.563)   (-1.575)   (-1.339)   (-1.157)   (-1.528)   
F R G N L N -9.951   -9.276   -9.418   -10.743   -9.967   
  (-3.580) *** (-3.437) *** (-3.906) *** (-3.959) *** (-3.840) *** 
A G L N 0.955   1.145   1.009   1.131   0.951   
  (1.006)   (1.062)   (1.102)   (1.030)   (0.996)   
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E -0.005   -0.004   -0.005   -0.005   -0.005   
  (-0.924)   (-0.737)   (-1.093)   (-1.024)   (-0.963)   
N O NIN T 0.391   0.377   0.423   0.216   -0.028   
  (1.398)   (1.333)   (1.441)   (0.688)   -(1.472)   
G AP12 0.037   0.043   0.026   0.038   0.039   
  (1.218)   (1.184)    0.794    1.372    1.318   
IN T RD -0.028   -0.025   -0.030   -0.020   -0.028   
  (-1.455)   (-1.293)   (-1.582)   (-1.129)   (-1.472)   
C AP -1.230   -1.147   -1.246   -0.986   -1.217   
  (-5.568) *** (-3.713) *** (-5.595) *** (-3.122) *** (-5.468) *** 
C 0.227   0.204   0.223   0.233   0.226   
  (2.163) ** (1.891) ** (2.275) ** (2.306) ** (2.157) ** 
  
                      
F ixed Year E ffect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included Observations 108   99   108   108   108   
R-squared 0.532   0.534   0.535   0.534   0.552   
Adjusted R-squared 0.411   0.400   0.414   0.413   0.436   
F-statistic 4.392   3.964   4.438   4.428   4.766   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 13.1: The relation between the net positive C Ds bought and the r isk of default 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the net positive difference between CD purchase and CD 
sold scaled by total loans on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non 
performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease 
losses/TL (LLP, model 5). All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 
2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
  Independent Variables (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5)   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O -1.176                   
  (-0.344)                   
R W A     -0.177               
      (-2.834) ***             
NPL         -8.650           
          (-1.547)           
L LP             -4.708       
              (-1.256)       
A L L                 -11.035   
                  (-2.454) ** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E 0.041   0.027   0.038   0.043   0.038   
  (1.761) * (1.085)   (1.658)   (1.789) * (1.615)   
N O NIN T -1.780   -1.888   -2.119   -2.252   -2.653   
  (-1.798) * (-1.900) * (-1.990) ** (-1.954) ** (-2.428) ** 
G AP12 -0.003   -0.009   -0.018   -0.050   -0.050   
  (-0.026)   (-0.085)   (-0.197)   (-0.465)   (-0.515)   
IN T RD -0.026   -0.034   -0.029   -0.031   -0.018   
  (-1.037)   (-1.104)   (-1.145)   (-1.239)   (-0.712)   
C AP -1.788   -0.982   -1.558   -1.828   -1.042   
  (-2.316) ** (-1.091)   (-2.144) ** (-2.443) ** (-1.498)   
  C -0.500   -0.138   -0.419   -0.512   -0.368   
  (-1.043)   (-0.274)   (-0.888)   (-1.038)   (-0.753)   
                      
F ixed Year Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included Observations 142   119   142   142   142   
R-squared 0.205   0.222   0.220   0.220   0.242   
Adjusted R-squared 0.096   0.091   0.113   0.113   0.138   
F-statistic 1.883   1.695   2.053   2.062   2.327   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.025   0.056   0.013   0.012   0.004   
                      
 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 13.2: The relation between net positive C Ds bought and the risk of default with control for loan categories 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the net positive difference between CD purchase and CD 
sold scaled by total loans on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non 
performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease 
losses/TL (LLP, model 5). All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 
2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
  Independent Variables (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5)   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O -0.058                   
  (-0.019)                   
R W A     -0.184               
      -1.665 *             
NPL         -10.784           
          -(1.940) *         
A L L             -11.605       
              -2.234 *     
L LP                 -3.429   
                  (-1.026)   
R L EST L N -0.219   -0.153   -0.248   -0.204   -0.220   
  (-2.172) ** (-1.247)   (-2.724) *** (-2.322) ** (-2.505) ** 
C & I L N -0.041   0.184   0.043   0.162   -0.040   
  (-0.220)    0.686    0.210   (0.699)   (-0.221)   
C NSM R L N -0.410   -0.356   -0.266   -0.273   -0.266   
  (-1.869) * (-1.847) * (-1.531) *   (-1.484)   (-1.531)   
F R G N L N -1.712   -2.980   -3.488   -4.356   -2.440   
  (-0.569)   (-0.958)   (-1.139)   (-1.558)   (-0.846)   
A G L N -5.549   -3.937   -6.238   -3.541   -6.061   
  (-2.638) ** (-1.336)   (-2.968) *** (-1.413)   (-2.834) *** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E 0.053   0.043   0.051   0.050   0.053   
  (0.037) ** (0.113)   (2.059) ** (2.005) ** (2.077) ** 
N O NIN T -2.886   -2.690   -3.089   -3.032   -2.910   
  (-2.509) ** (-2.113) ** (-2.741) *** (-2.661) ** (-2.565) ** 
G AP12 -0.055   -0.103   -0.090   -0.116   -0.075   
  (-0.522)   (-0.947)   (-0.885)   (-1.074)   (-0.723)   
IN T RD 0.039   0.009   0.041   0.033   0.037   
  (0.201)   (0.851)   (0.164)    1.131    1.225   
C AP -1.232   -0.766   -0.993   -0.760   -1.269   
  (-1.901) * (-0.853)   (-1.528)   -(1.215)   (-1.903) * 
C -0.635   -0.396   -0.578   -0.558   -0.607   
  (-1.223)   (-0.752)   (-1.135)   (-1.084)   (-1.172)   
  
                      
F ixed Year E ffect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included Observations 142   119   142   142   142   
R-squared 0.251   0.266   0.272   0.280   0.257   
Adjusted R-squared 0.113   0.098   0.137   0.147   0.120   
F-statistic 1.813   1.582   2.017   2.108   1.871   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.023   0.067   0.009   0.006   0.017   
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 14.1: The relation between the net C Ds sold and the risk of default 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the net positive difference between CD sold and CD buy 
scaled by total loans on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non 
performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease 
losses/TL (LLP, model 5). All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 
2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
 
  Independent Variables (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5)   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O 1.379                   
  (1.278)                   
R W A     -0.015               
      (-0.362)               
NPL         0.689           
          (0.380)           
L LP             1.228       
              (1.554)       
A L L                 0.748   
                  (0.486)   
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E 0.010   0.012   0.013   0.010   0.013   
  (1.683) * (2.151) ** (2.086) ** (1.713) * (2.222) ** 
N O NIN T -1.526   -1.269   -1.487   -1.508   -1.498   
  (-2.747) *** (-2.412) ** (-2.482) ** (-2.738) *** (-2.567) ** 
G AP12 -0.189   -0.187   -0.191   -0.190   -0.193   
  (-2.191) ** (-2.244) ** (-2.235) ** (-2.218) ** (-2.348) ** 
IN T RD 0.051   0.064   0.048   0.052   0.048   
  (1.947) * (1.851) * (1.870) * (2.013) ** (1.825) * 
C AP -1.123   -1.043   -1.206   -1.083   -1.207   
  (-3.418) *** (-3.197) *** (-3.686) *** (-3.262) *** (-3.699) *** 
  C -0.047   -0.095   -0.098   -0.040   -0.101   
  (-0.476)   (-0.903)   (-0.930)   (-0.424)   (-1.016)   
                      
F ixed Year Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included Observations 86   74   86   86   86   
R-squared 0.453   0.500   0.446   0.457   0.446   
Adjusted R-squared 0.317   0.349   0.307   0.321   0.308   
F-statistic 3.318   3.299   3.218   3.362   3.224   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
                      
 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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Table 14.2: The relation between the net C Ds sold and the risk of default with control for loan categories 
The table presents the coefficients of multiple regressions of the net positive difference between CD sold and CD buy 
scaled by total loans on net loan charge off/TL (NCO, model 1), risk weighted assets/TA (RWA, model 2), non 
performing loans/ TL (NPL, model 3), allowance for credit losses/TL (ALL, model 4), and provision for loan and lease 
losses/TL (LLP, model 5). All other variables are defined in Table 3. YR dummy is included for each year from 1998 to 
2008 to capture the time dependence variation of loan pricing a 
  Independent Variables (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5)   
Te
st
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N C O -0.215                   
  (-0.142)                   
R W A     0.033               
      (0.699)               
NPL         0.065           
          (0.062)           
A L L             -0.835       
              (-0.362)       
L LP                 -1.349   
                  (-0.511)   
R L EST L N -0.116   -0.131   -0.116   -0.110   -0.091   
  (-0.618)   (-0.719)   (-0.631)   (-0.581)   (-0.473)   
C & I L N -0.158   -0.195   -0.160   -0.141   -0.116   
  (-0.717)   (-0.895)   (-0.739)   (-0.624)   (-0.497)   
C NSM R L N 0.103   0.085   0.088   0.130   0.148   
  (0.503)   (0.484)   (0.464)   (0.604)   (0.692)   
F R G N L N -4.641   -4.477   -4.615   -4.825   -4.417   
  (-1.871) * (-1.708) * (-1.794) * (-1.807) * (-1.886) * 
A G L N -9.293   -8.779   -9.167   -9.216   -9.491   
  (-2.368) ** (-2.199) ** (-2.319) ** (-2.488) ** (-2.369) ** 
C
on
tr
ol
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SI Z E  -0.003   -0.004   -0.004   -0.003   -0.003   
  (-0.392)   (-0.492)   (-0.416)   (-0.389)   (-0.368)   
N O NIN T -0.751   -0.734   -0.789   -0.715   -0.673   
  (-0.938)   (-1.010)   -(1.024)   (-0.900)   (-0.854)   
G AP12 -0.197   -0.204   -0.195   -0.197   -0.196   
  (-2.185) ** (-2.206) ** (-2.159) ** (-2.184) ** (-2.250) ** 
IN T RD 0.111   0.125   0.111   0.112   0.113   
  (2.193) ** (2.100) ** (2.177) ** (2.175) ** (2.187) ** 
C AP -1.290   -1.153   -1.265   -1.290   -1.306   
  (-2.976)   (-2.882)   (-2.898)   (-3.131)   (-3.105)   
C 0.335   0.310   0.337   0.329   0.304   
  (1.194) * (1.137) * (1.212) * (1.182) * (1.110) * 
F ixed Year E ffect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Included Observations 86   74   86   86   86   
R-squared 0.529   0.567   0.529   0.530   0.531   
Adjusted R-squared 0.365   0.380   0.365   0.366   0.368   
F-statistic 3.219   3.037   3.218   3.232   3.247   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.001   0.000   0.000   0.000   
 
a all figures in parenthesis are t-stats and asterisks are given if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10(*),5(**) and 1(***) % level.   
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F igure 1: Typical structure of a credit default contract 
 
Credit default swaps are bilateral contracts between two parties, protection buyer and protection seller. These bilateral 
derivative contracts allow investors to buy or sell the credit risk of a reference entity without transferring the underlying 
asset to the counterparty. Under the agreement, the default protection buyer makes fixed periodic payments to the default 
protection seller, and in return, the protection seller covers the losses to the buyer in any credit event that occurs to the 
reference assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Energy Credit Association 
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F igure 2: Credit events that may activate a credit derivative contract 
 
 Event Definition 
1 Bankruptcy Includes events of bankruptcy or insolvency as defined by English, New 
York, or other laws as well as any events that may be interpreted as 
furtherance of a bankruptcy or insolvency event  
2 Obligation 
Acceleration 
This event covers situations where the relevant obligation becomes due and 
payable as a result of a default by the reference entity before the time when 
such obligation would otherwise have been due and payable  
3 Obligation 
Default 
Covers the situation, other than a Failure to Pay, where the relevant 
obligation becomes capable of being declared due and payable as a result of 
a default by the reference entity before the time when such obligation 
would otherwise have been capable of being so declared. 
4 Failure to Pay Failure of the reference entity to make, when and where due, any payments 
under one or more obligations 
5 Repudiation/ 
Moratorium 
Deals with the situation where the reference entity or a governmental 
authority disaffirms, disclaims or otherwise challenges the validity of the 
relevant obligation. 
6 Restructuring Events a result of which the terms governing the relevant obligation, as 
agreed by the reference entity and the holders of the relevant obligation, 
have become less favourable to the holders. These events include a 
reduction in the principal amount or interest payable under the obligation, a 
postponement of payment, a change in ranking in priority of payment or 
any other composition of payment. For the purposes of the credit default 
contracts only events that lead to a deterioration in the creditworthiness or 
financial condition of the reference entity count as restructuring events 
 
Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) definitions of credit events (http://www.credit-
deriv.com/isdadefinitions.htm)
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F igure 3: Growth of credit derivatives1 
 
Sources: BBA, International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), Bank of International Settlements (BIS), and 
Risk Magazine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
1 The figure is taken from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper. 
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F igure 4: Market participants of credit derivatives 
 
 
Source: International Energy Credit Association 
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F igure 5: The figure shows the number of BHCs holding only buying positions (CD BUYERS) in the credit derivative 
market in each of the year from 1997 to 2008   
 
                                  
 
F igure 6: The figure shows the number of BHCs holding only selling positions (CD SELLERS) in the credit derivative 
market in each of the year from 1997 to 2008   
. 
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F igure 7: The figure shows the number of BHCs holding both buying and selling positions (CD BUYERS & SELLERS) 
in the credit derivative market in each of the year from 1997 to 2008   
 
 
                                  
